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OF THE CASE 
Appellants Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, Inc., and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Saint Alphon:o,us Diycrsified Care, Inc. ("Saint Alphonsus" or the "Hospital"). appeal 
a judgment on contract and tort claims asserted on retrial by Respondents MRI Associates. MRI 
Limited Partnership ("Center"), and MRI Mobile Limited Partnership (,'Mobile") (collectively, 
"MRIA"). In its 2009 decision in tlus case overruling a jury's a\vard to MRIA of $36 million in 
lost-profit damages, this Couri linuted MRIA's allowable claims and damages in important ways. 
Saint Alphonslis Diversified Care, Inc. v. J'vfRl Associate, LLP, 148 Idaho 479,224 P.3d 1068 
(2009) ("S~4DC'). On remand, MRIA nevertheless sought and recoyered 552 million in lost-
profits damages-a greater amount than was a\'larded at the first trial. This result follmved 
directly from the fact that the trial couri departed from this Court's prior decision in several 
important respects. 
Fir.st, this Court held in SADC that Saint Alphonsus's 2004 dissociation from MRIA did 
not violate an express provision of the MRIA palinership agreement, which meant that the 
Hospital had a statutory right to dissociate and to compete vvith MRIA starting in April 2005. 
Nevertheless, the trial court improperly allowed the jury to prenlise liability on the Hospital's 
rightful dissociation and erroneously permitted MRIA to claim and recover S40 nlilhon in 
damages-more than 80% of its total award-for profits lost to lawful competition between 
2005 and 2015. 
Second, this Court held in SADC that MRIA's proof oflost profits must satisfy the 
concems expressed in Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P.2d 988 (1982). 
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'U',,>H'H~HH!"', this clear directive, MRIA relied on the same insufficient evidence introduced 
at the first trial, which merely assumed causation without a shred of evidence that wrongdoing by 
Hospital \vas responsible for all or any particular portion ofMRIA's claimed loss of business 
to a powerfhl competitor. 
Third, this Court ruled in :L4DC that MRlA \vas vvrongly mvarded damages for claimed 
injuries to non-parties Center and Mobile. But the trial court improperly t1:eed MRlA of the 
consequences of that ruling by permitting it to join those entities on remand even though their 
claims were long since time-barred. 
'While disregarding this Court's prior decision in these respects, the trial court also 
committed several other critical legal errors that greatly aided :fv1RIA in securing a verdict of 
liability and the exorbitant damages award. 
The court erred in denying a directed verdict, and allowing MRIA to vociferously assert 
that the Hospital breached its fIduciary duty by failing to enforce a contractual obligation of its 
radiologists to provide 2417 service to MRI Center's outpatients. The plain language of the 
contract between the Hospital and the radiologists created no such obligation. 
More generally, in a trial focused on MRlA's claim that the Hospital destroyed the 
parties' relationship by sharp dealing, secretiveness, and intimidating conduct the court received 
\vide-ranging prejudicial and inadmissible evidence offered by MRlA, while constraining Saint 
Alphonsus i1:om offering proper, responsive evidence. 
For all of these reasons, and others detailed below, the cOUli should vacate the judgment 
and verdict and order judgment for Saint Alphonsus or, in the alternative, a ne\v trial. 
-2-
STATEMENT UF FACTS 
Saint Alphonsus is a hospital that has selTed the Boise area for more than a century, 
providing patients \vith a full range of medical care. This includes radiology-the use of medical 
imaging such as x-ray, ultrasound, CT, and MRI to diagnose and treat disease \vithin the human 
body. Tr., VoL 5, p. 776, L 11 to p. 777. L 23. 1 Saint Alphonsus patients (either admitted 
inpatients or emergency room visitors) recei,'e radiological treatment at the request of a treating 
physician at the hospital, \vho requests an appropriate medical scan to be performed at an 
imaging [1cility. ld, VoL 4, p. 495, L 25 to p. 496, L 8. Technicians at that facility use the 
requested imaging equipment (the x-ray scanner, the CT machine, etc.) to produce images or 
"scans" of the patient's body. ld, Vol. 2, p. 183, L 14 to p. 185, L 10. This is known as the 
"technical" aspect of radiology. ld. These scans are then interpreted by a radiologist in 
consultation with the patient's treating physician-the "professional" aspect ld. At Saint 
Alphonsus, the professional interpretation of medical images has been done for decades by Gem 
State Radiology ("GSR"), an organized group of radiologists \vith a contract obligating and 
giving the group an exclusive right to serve the professional radiological needs of patients of 
Saint Alphonsus. Ex. 4033, 4229. 
For most medical imaging technologies, Saint Alphonsus itself has generally O\vned the 
necessary equipment, which is operated by employee-technicians in the Saint Alphonsus 
Radiology Department. Tr., VoL 20, p. 4309, L 8 to P. 4310, L5. One exception was Magnetic 
1 The retrial transcript and record are refened to herein as "Tr., VoL _, p. _, L _" and the 
record as "R _." (The 2011 clerk's record, as provided to counsel, is paginated consecutively, 
but has no volumes.) The 2007 trial record is abbreviated as "2007 Tr." and "2007 R" 
Resonance Imaging equipment. Unti12005, that equipment was owned and operated by 
MRIA, an Idaho general partnership created in 1985, whose principals included both the 
Hospital and a group of five Boise doctors known as Doctors Magnetic Resonance, Inc. 
("DMR"). MRIA's linlited palinerships, Center and Mobile, provided sen'ices on the Saint 
Alphonsus hospital campus, and in the surrounding community, respectiyely. Id.; Ex. 4023. 
4024.4028. Thus, Center performed l\1RI scans for Hospital patients who needed them, and 
GSR reviewed those scans under its contract to prO\'ide such services for all Hospital patients. 
Tr., Vol. 4, p. 498, L. 10-22, Vol. 26. p. 5806, L. 24 to p. 5807, L. 2. But MRI Center also had 
numerous outpatients of its own, who were not patients of the Hospital, and who became the 
majority ofMRI Center's business by the late 1990s. Tr., Vol. 4. p. 497, L. 4-18, Vol. 20, p. 
4313, L. 10 to p. 4314, L. 10: Ex. 4309 (85% ofMRI Center patients were not hospital patients). 
Although the GSR doctors did not have any contract requiring or entitling them to read the scans 
for l'v1RI Center's outpatients, they did so by mutual agreement bet\veen 1985 and January 3, 
2005, when l'v1RIA fired them. Tr., VoL 4, p. 533, L. 11 to p. 534, L. 7, Ex. 4353. 
The current dispute began in 1998, when GSR-led by Dr. David Giles, \vho was also 
one of the DMR doctors-began planning to open Intermountain Medical Imaging ("IMI"), an 
outpatient radiology center in Boise that would offer all imaging modalities, including MRI. Tr., 
Vol. 25, p. 5617, L. 17 to p. 5624, L. 12. Independent radiology centers were then being opened 
successfully natiom-vide, and GSR-a ' .. ery highly regarded local radiology group-had the 
professional and financial wherewithal to successfully operate its own imaging center. Tr., Vol. 
1O,p.1691,L.20top.1693,L.1O;Vo1.12,p.2178,L. 7-18,p.2189,L.20top.2192,L.15; 
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L 4-8, p. 13 to p. 5244, L . VoL 26, p. 5799, L 4 to p. 5800, L 17. 
In August 1998, GSR purchased land at 9th and Myrtle in dmvntown Boise, and only then 
informed Hospital CEO Sandra Bruce of plan and inyited the Hospital to participate in the 
venture. Tr., Vol. 10, p. 1679, L 2 to p. 1680, L 14: Vol. p. 5215, L 4 to p. 5217, L 15; Ex. 
572,4055. 
In order to continue its long-standing relationships with both GSR and MRIA on 
mutually bendicial tenns, Saint Alphonsus initiated, at an MRIA board meeting on October 22, 
1998, discussions aimed at involving both MRIA and the Hospital as partners in GSR's new 
entelprise. Tr., Vol. 4, p. 637, L 8 to p. 639, L 23, VoL 23, p. 5223, L 10 to p. 5224, L. 24; Ex. 
4062. The Hospital proposed, and all the MRIA partners agreed to pursue, a "two-track" plan 
for negotiations: J\1RIA and GSR would negotiate for shared ownership ofIMI's J\OO operation, 
while Saint Alphonsus would negotiate to patineI' in IMI's other, non-J\1RI imaging operations 
(i.e., CT, x-ray, ultrasound, etc.). Jd. 
While the talks between Saint Alphonsus and IMI slmvly progressed toward a partnership 
dealing with the non-MRI modalities of IMI, the talks between J\1RIA and GSR \vere not fruitfhl. 
After J\1RIA and GSR appeared close to an agreement in early 1999, J\1RLA changed the terms of 
the discussion in mid-1999, to offer less attractive terms that MRLA's CEO at the time 
recognized would likely be rejected by GSR. Tr., Vol. 16, p. 3313, L. 3 to p. 3314, L. 8; Ex. 800; 
Ex. 4085; see also il1fra note 12 (discussing the changes in detail). Thereafter, the discussions 
stalled, and GSR rejected MRIA's otTer and stated its reasons for doing so at an angry meeting 
held on December 16, 1999. Tr., Vol. 10, p. 1729, L 5 to p. 1746, L 18; Ex. 4123. Following 
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meeting, eYell MR1A there \yas no ;'-HiHi'- v a forMR1A GSRto 
partner together, Tr., Vol. 12, p. 2359, L. 2-15, p. 2394, L. 2-13, and Saint Alphonsus began 
,yorking on a difterent deal to acquire Center from MRIA in an arms-length transaction. Ex. 96; 
Vol. 13, p. 2421, L. 5 to p. 2423, L. 23; Vol. 1 p. 3328, L. 6 to p. L. 24. While Saint 
Alphonsus was seriously interested in pursuing such a deaL Tr., Vol. 10, p. 1791, L. 17 to p. 
1792, L. 8, in April or r.,/fay of 2000, MRIA decided not to support the deal on the tenns 
proposed. Tr., VoL 13, p. 2435, L. 2 to p. 2436, L. 19; Vol. 16, p. 3331, L. 1 to p. 3333, L. 6. 
The IM1 facility at 9th and Myrtle opened on September 1, 1999, Tr., Vol. 15, p. 3025, as 
an enterprise of the GSR radiologists in which Saint Alphonsus had no ownership interest. Tr., 
Vol. 12, p. 2351, L. 20 to p. 2352, L. 21; Vol. 16, p. 3267, L. 7-10; Vol. 22, p. 4965, L. 18-22; 
Vol. 23, p. 5222, L. 20 to p. 5223, L. 9. IM1 immediately began receiving referrals from 
community physicians, many of whom had long-standing relationships with particular GSR 
radiologists, and some of whom had previously referred outpatients to MRI Center. Tr., Vol. 25, 
p. 5544, L. 17 to p. 5546, L. 15; Vol. 26, p. 5774, L. 21 to p. 5776, L. 14, p. 5799, L. 4 to p. 5801, 
L. 17. At the same time, Saint Alphonsus Hospital patients continued to receive their MRI scans 
at MRI Center, and the GSR radiologists continued to read scans for both Hospital patients and 
MRl Center's outpatients, as \'lell as for IMI's own, separate patients. Tr., VoL 4, p. 495, L. 3 to 
p. 498, L. 22, p. 532, L. 3 to p. 533, L. 18, p. 4965, L. 7-11. 
On July 1,2001, nearly two years after 1MI opened, Saint Alphonsus entered into an 
operating agreement that by its terms made Saint Alphonsus a partner in "the nOll-lVfRI portion 
of [IMI]." Ex. 4226 § L 1. And in 2002, IMI opened a second outpatient radiology center in 
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nearby Meridian. Tr., p. L 20-2 L During this time, the parties unsuccessfully 
tried to negotiate Saint Alphonsus's purchase of Center from MRIA. Tr., Vol. 22, p. 4862, L 14 
to p. 4866, L 5; VoL 23, p. 4998, L 18-23; Ex. 4272. ~With negotiations at an impasse, Saint 
AlphollSus gaye notice on February 24, of its intent to dissociate from MRIA. Ex. 4329. 
The Hospital's dissociation on April 1,2004, triggered a one-year non-compete clause fl1r 
MRl services that expired on April 1, 2005. Tr., VoL 29, p. 6581, L 4-5. Saint Alphonsus 
honored that obligation, and MRl Center continued performing wIRl scans for Hospital patients 
until December 2005. Ex. 4377. In December 2005, Saint Alphonsus opened a ne\v on-campus 
facility for its own patients, which was operated jointly by the Hospital and IM!. Tr., Vol. 29, p. 
6581, L 6-7. In 2006, Saint Alphonsus agreed to become a 50% partner in the MRI business of 
IMI, in exchange for payments of approximately $1 1.2 million. Tr., Vol. 22, p. 4888, L 3-19. 
COFRSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Original Proceeding and First Appeal. On October 18,2004, Saint Alphonsus sued 
MRlA for the value of its partnership interest, under Idaho Code § 53-3-701. 2007 R., VoL I, pp. 
55-62. Seven months later, on May 20,2005, MRlA filed counterclaims, alleging that Saint 
Alphonsus had wrongfully dissociated, and had breached fiduciary and contractual duties to the 
partnership by allegedly assisting IMI and thereby causing C enter and Mobile to lose business to 
IMI. Id. pp. 63-79. On March 7, 2006, MRIA filed additional claims against Saint Alphonsus, 
for breach of the partnership agreemenfs non-compete clause, interference with prospective 
contractual relations or business expectations, and civil conspiracy, as well as a third-party 
complaint against GSR, IMI, and an afflliate (all of whom settled prior to trial). Id. pp. 141-78. 
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On July 24,2006, the court granted MRlA's motion for summary judgment on the 
ground that Saint Alphonsus's Aprill, 2004 dissociation had been \\'rongful because in breach of 
an express contractual provision. At triaL MRIA recovered damages f()r itse1t~ and "on behalf of" 
non-parties MRI Center and MRI Mobile, ofS36 million. 2007 R., Vol. XIII, p. 2497. 
On appeal, this Court vacated the entire judgment and remanded lor a new trial. Saint 
Alphonslls Direl:<;?(zed Care, Inc. v. JIR1Assocs., LLP, 148 Idaho 479, SOL 224 P.3d 1068,1090 
(2009) ("SADC"). It reversed the district court's summary judgment for plaintiff on wrongful 
dissociation, holding that no express provision was violated. Id. at 488-89,224 P.3d at 1077-78. 
It also held that MRIA could not recover damages suffered by non-parties Center and Mobile, 
and that damages could not extend beyond 2015. Id. at 497,224 P.3d at 1086. And this Court 
also directed the trial court, on remand, to address \"'hether MRIA's lost-profits damages proof 
\vas insufficient under the ruling in Pope v. Intermountain Gas, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 
1005, that a claimant may not compute damages by "assum[ing], without any SUppOlt in the 
record that [a competitor-here IMI] 'would not have won any portion of the ... market" absent 
the alleged wrongdoing. See .s:J.DC, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d at 1087. 
2. Pretrial Proceedings Following Remand. Following this Court's decision on 
October 21, 2009, the case was assigned to Judge Michael Wethere11. 
On February 17,2010, the COUlt allowed MRIA to file amended counterclaims adding 
Center and Mobile as parties. Hr'g Tr. p. 13, L. 15-20 (Feb. 17,2010). In response to Saint 
A1phonsus's subsequent motion to dismiss those parties' claims as time-ban-ed, the couti ruled 
that their claims related back to MRIA's original pleading and were thus timely. R. 579. The 
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court rejected the Hospital's motion arguing that MRIA's evidence lost profits \,>'us 
legally insufficient under Pope. ld. at 570. 
In same order, the district court granted Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary 
judgment on MRIA's alternative claim of\yrongful dissociation by violation of a contractual 
tenn of years under Idaho Code § 53-3-602(2), and further ruled that the Hospital had "a 
statutOlY right to dissociate without liability." ld. at 556-59. 
In February 2011, the court announced that it \yould not "revisit" the "numerous 
decisions made in the original trial by Judge McLaughlin that the Supreme Court did not find in 
error." Hr'g Tr., p. 42, L. 18 to p. 43, L. 14 (Feb. 9,2011). The court did, however, allow the 
parties to file supplemental expert reports on damages. R. 728-31. 
In the six months preceding trial, the court issued several rulings relevant to this appeal: 
First, the court granted MRIA's motion in limine to prevent Saint Alphonsus from 
refeni.ng to its dissociation as "la\vful" or "ti.ghtful," because the trial court perceived that any 
"comment on the propriety or lawfulness of Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation from MRIA" or use 
of the statutory term "rightful dissociation" \vOlIld be prejudicia1. R. 1350-51,2085 (denying 
reconsideration). 
Second, the court denied the Hospital's motion to redact language in hvo memoranda 
suggesting that the Hospital received advance waming that its dissociation might be wrongful-
notwithstanding the Hospital's already recognized "statutOlY right to dissociate." In these late-
1001 memos, Saint Alphonsus's consultant, Shattuck Hammond, adyised that dissociation would 
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CatTY a of St. Alphonsus breaching its fiduciary duty to the LPs," and "\vould likely 
engender litigation with 1vIRIA." See Ex. 4234, 4239; R. 1351,2085 (denying reconsideration). 
Third, in response to the Hospital's motion to exclude evidence of competition by Saint 
Aiphonsus after expiration of its non-compete obligation on Aprill, 2005, R. 883-85, the court 
agreed in principle that "Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete after the expiration of the 
noncompetition agreement." But it also reserved ruling on whether most of the challenged 
evidence would be admissible, because "MRIA could potentially shmv that" some of it is 
"related to ... wrongful conduct on the part of Saint Alphonsus." R. 1352-53. 
Fourth, in response to Saint Alphonsus's motion for summary judgment that it is entitled 
to a "pro rata" (or equal-shares) apportionment of damages because MRIA had alleged that GSR 
was a joint tortieasor and then settled with GSR prior to the first trial, see Idaho Code § 6-806; R. 
897-89, the court m1ed that "Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a reduction in any damages awarded 
against it in an amount based on app01iionment of fault to be detemlined at trial." R. 1381. 
Fifth, the court granted MRIA's motion in limine to exclude reference to Saint 
Alphonsus's status as a non-profit hospital, even though that legal status was mentioned freely 
during the first trial and not challenged on the first appeal to the Supreme Court. R.2080-83. 
Sixth, and finally, in a ruling rendered three weeks after trial began, the court rejected 
motions by the Hospital (R. 2326-32, R. 2426-33, R. 2332-37) to exclude MRIA's new claims 
for disgorgement and diminution-of-value damages that MRIA had first asserted just w'eeks 
earlier, and also to exclude MRIA's post-Apri12005 damages evidence for failure to prove any 
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connection to Hospital that occurred prior to dissociation and expiration of the 
non-compete agreement. R. 2616-20. 
3. Retrial. Retrial of this case commenced on September 6, 2011. From the start, 
MRIA presented the jury with its theory that it was injured by IMI's competitive success, \yhich 
,vas allegedly caused entirely by Saint Alphonsus's alleged secretive and ruthless misconduct, 
\'lith none ofIMI's success attributable to the undisputed skill and favorable reputations ofIMI's 
radiologists. MRIA pressed its theory with several \vitnesses and documents admitted over Saint 
A1phonsus's obj ection. 
F or instance, to show that Saint A1phonsus intimidated its partners through a "culture of 
fear," Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2885, L. 25 to p. 2886, L. 9, MRIA focused throughout trial on Saint 
Alphonsus's unrelated termination of a pathologist, Dr. Steven Wi1son.2 Dr. Wilson was 
pennitted to testify, over Saint Alphonsus's objection, that he had not been given a reason for his 
tennination. Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2906, L. 15 to p. 2910, L. 8. The court reasoned that such f~li1ure to 
give an explanation "is relevant" to whether Wilson was fired "for purely monetary gain," 
explaining that "evidence of prior conduct of a similar nature is admissible" in this unrelated 
case to prove an improper financial motivation. Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2890, L. 7 to p. 2900, L. 17. 
Likewise, MRIA repeatedly cited the Shattuck Hammond memoranda, see supra pp. 9-10, 
and their language stating that dissociation might breach fiduciary duties, to imply both that the 
Hospital's dissociation was wrongful and that Saint Alphonsus knew in advance that it was 
2 See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 2, p. 36, L. 21 to p. 40, L. 25, Vol. 6, p. 895, L. 19 to p. 898, L. 4-21; 
Vol. 13, p. 1175, L. 5 to p. 1176, L. 10; Vol. 11, p. 1926, L. 3-22; Vol. 20, p. 4252, L. 6-24; Vol. 
23, p. 5199, L. 9 to p. 5200, L. 10, Vol. 24, p. 5363, L. 11 to p. 5364, L. 18. 
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Center and "tvlobile' s rights. Ex. 4234, Tr.. Vol. 1 L p. 1998, L. 15 to p. 2004, L. 
5, Vol. 23, p. 5121, L. 1 to p. 5125, L. 12. 
At the same time, the Hospital was denied the opportunity to offer certain evidence to 
counter J'vlRIA's portrayal of Saint Alphonsus, even though it had been admitted at the first trial 
and not appealed by MRIA. As noted above, Saint Alphonsus was not permitted to tell the jury 
that it had rightflllly dissociated or that it is a non-profit institution. Hospital COO Cindy 
Schamp was also balTed fi'om repeating her testimony from the first trial (2007 Tr., p. 3409, L. 
17 to p. 3416, L. 16), the admission of which was not appealed, that Dr. Giles ofDMR had asked 
her to spy on Sandra Bruce and report back to him. Tr., Vo1. 12, p. 2272, L. 23 to p. 2283. L. 24. 
Saint Alphonsus \vas also precluded from offering evidence rebutting 11R1A's claims that 
the Hospital kept secret its negotiations \vith 1M1 to participate in the non-MRI side of its 
business, e.g., Tr., Vo1. 2, p. 54, L. 6 to p. 62, L. 10 (opening statement); Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6663, L. 
19 to p. 6665, L. 7 (closing). Thus, when MRIA's first \vitness, Dr. James Prochaska, testified 
that Saint Alphonsus had kept secret its partnership with 1M1 until 2006, Saint Alphonsus was 
balTed from putting before him on cross examination a 2002 ne\vspaper aliicle ft'om the Idaho 
Business Review that publicly discussed the Saint Alphonsus-1M1 partnership. Tr., Vol. 6, p. 805, 
L. 7 to p. 813, L. 5. Cindy Schamp was likewise not allowed, supposedly on hearsay grounds, to 
present testimony admitted at the first trial about her discussions with MRIA's fonner CEO, Dr. 
Roger CUlTan (who died in 2004), keeping him apprised of the Saint Alphonsus-IM1 negotiations. 
2007 Tr., p. 2271. L. 19-25, p. 2299, L 8-21, p. 2302, L. 12-21, p. 2331, L. 9-16, p. 2237, L. 4 to 
p. 2238, L 5, p. 2342, L. 20-23, p. 3419, L. 11 to p. 3427, L 25. 
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;\1RlA contended that a agreement between Saint 
Alphonsus and GSR-to which MRIA \vas not a party-required GSR to sen-ice MRI Center's 
outpatients on equal terms as the Hospital's patients. MRIA further asserted that Saint 
Alphonsus's aIle ged failure to enforce this contractual "right"-i. e., its failure to fbrce GSR to 
offer more hours of coyerage for Center's outpatients-was a breach of its fiduciary duties to 
MRIA. E.g., Tr., Vol. 2, p. 83, L. 11-23, VoL 14, p. 2645, L. 13 to p. 2646, L. 12, Vol. 15, p. 
2950, L. 18 to p. 2958, L. 15, Vol. 19, p. 3938, L. 1 to p. 3965, L. 20, Vol. 20, p. 4276, L. 5 to p. 
4284, L. 12. Saint Alphonsus moved for a directed verdict that this contract between the 
Hospital and GSR unambiguously goyerned only GSR's rights and obligations to treat Saint 
Alphonsus's patients, and gave the Hospital no right to force GSR to perionn duties for non-
hospital patients ofMRlA. R. 2813-23. But the cOUli ruled that the contract was ambiguous, 
and thus left the issue of contract construction to the jury. J\1RIA was thus left free to rely on 
these assertions, and argue at length in closing. that Saint Alphonsus breached its fiduciary duty 
by failing to compel GSR to treat MRI Center outpatients on a 2417 basis. Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6627, 
L. 9 to p. 6629, L. 10, p. 6670, L. 20 to p. 6671, L. 23, p. 6681, L. 21 to p. 6682, L. 7, p. 6810, L. 
21 to p. 6815, L. 4. 
As pertinent to this appeal. the court also instructed the jUlY that "Saint Alphonsus 
dissociated fi'om the MRlA partnership on April 1, 2004, pursuant to its right to do so under 
Idaho law" and "you may not award damages ... based upon [that] dissociation." Tr., VoL 29, p. 
6581, L. 23 to p. 6582, L. 1. But it also instmcted, over objection, Tr., Vol. 28, p. 6397, L 17 to 
p. 640L L. 17, that 110tyvithstanding Saint Alphonsus's adherence "to the strict legal 
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requirements ... the MRI partnership agreement," it can "still held responsible for 
violating a fiduciary duty to its partners if the action taken was improperly motivated." R.3242 
(Jury Instr. 50.) The court thus left it to the jury to detennlne \vhether Saint Alphonsus breached 
its fiducimy duty when it left the partnership pursuant to the statute and consistent with the 
contract, but \vhile "improperly motiyated." TL, Vol. 29, p. 6593, L. 14-25. 
The court also instructed that the partnership agreement's non-compete clause expired on 
Aprill, 2005, so that "you may not award damages ... simply because Saint Alphonsus 
competed with [the MRIA entities] after Aprill, 2005." Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6582, L. 1-5. But it also 
instmcted that the jury could properly "award damages ... for any injury caused by Saint 
Alphonsus conduct prior to 2005, even if the damages caused by those actions occun-ed after 
2005." Id., L. 6-15. 
Finally, the court instructed--contrary to its June 17, 2011 ruling that it would allow a 
"reduction in any damages awarded" based on "apportionment offlmlt," R. 1381 (emphasis 
added}-that only the damages arising from tort claims, and not contract claims, would be 
apportioned. Saint Alphonsus objected on the ground that because MRIA alleged a single 
pattern of joint activity violating both tort and contract duties, all claims \vere subject to 
apportionment. Tr., Vol. 28, p. 6417. L. 21 to p. 6427, L. 19. p. 6520, L. 11 to p. 6528, L. 24, p. 
6547, L. 4 to p. 6552, L. 13. 
The jury returned a verdict for MRIA on all of the counterclaims and, though each of 
these claims \vas based on the same underlying facts, found that Saint Alphonsus \vas 80% 
responsible for the conspiracy, 90% responsible for tortious interference with contract, and 100<;& 
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responsible for the fiducialY duty. R. 3168-71. For each cause of action, the jury 
awarded, in the alternative, damages tor Center's and Mobile's alleged lost profits through 2015 
(S27,922,388 and 524,162J27 respectively) and damages for Center's alleged loss in value 
between 2003 and the present (S25,420,000), in each instance multiplying the <1\vard by Saint 
Alphonsus's share of responsibility and allocating 7.5% of the damages to J'vIRI Associates based 
on its management fee. R. 3171-80. The jury also returned a verdict on MRIA's claims that 
Saint Alphonsus misappropriated opportunities to partner with GSR in 1MI and to open a facility 
in Meridian. Id. Sitting in equity, the district court subsequently awarded, as a remedy tor the 
alleged misappropriation of the opportunity to partner with GSR, disgorgement of profits in the 
amount of $2 L353,838 as "an alternative to all other measures of damages suffered by all the 
MRIA entities." R. 5281-84, R. 3368-70. 
Saint Alphonsus moved for judgment 110tw'ithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, 
based 011 many errors including those described ab(we. R. 3377-79. The district cou1i denied the 
motiol1s, with the exception of rnling that the apportionment of tault on the tortious interference 
claim v;muld be reduced to 80%. R.4693. 
The court also reinstated the av\,ard from the first trial of 54.6 million to Saint A1pho11sus 
against MRIA on Saint Alphonsus's claim for its departing-partner share, plus interest at a rate of 
10% from September 2007 (\vhen the judgment was originally entered), denying Saint 
Alphonsus's request tor interest at the statutory rate from the date of dissociation, as required by 
Idaho Code § 53-3-701(b). The court offset Saint Alphonsus's a\vard against MRIA's awards 
(after applying accrued interest to Saint Alphonsus' s claim) tor each of the multiple alternatives 
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set f011h in the judgment, with the highest total a\vard, for the breach of contract and breach of 
fiduciary duty claims, resulting in $25.8 million to MRI Center, $22.3 million to MRI Mobile, 
and million mved by MRIA Associates to Saint Alphonsus. R. 5282-83. The court also 
awarded MRIA $4.2 million in costs and fees, including $53,000 in post-judgment costs and fees 
oyer Saint Alphonsus's objection. R. 5284. This appeal iollmved. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Must the lost profits damages awards in the Fifth Amended Judgment be set aside 
because: 
a. as to the profits of$28 million found by the jury to haye been lost by MRI 
Center, :tvOOA failed to proye either the quantity of scan business lost by Center to IMI, or (as 
required by Pope) what if any portion of that lost business went to IMI as a result of wrongful 
conduct by Saint Alphonsus? 
b. as to the profits of $24 million found by the jUlY to have been lost by MRI 
Mobile to IMI's Meridian location as a result of Saint Alphonsus's supposed usurpation of the 
Meridian opportunity, MRIA simply assumed without proof, and contrary to substantial admitted 
evidence and this Court's decision in Trilogy NetH'ork, that Mobile's profits \vould haye been 
identical to those aChmlly realized by 1MI? 
c. approximately 80% of the $52 million in lost profits found by the jury was 
attributed to business allegedly \von by 1MI after April 1 , 2005, ,vhen Saint Alphonsus could 
lawfully compete, and MRIA made no showing whatsoeyer that any, let alone all, such losses 
were caused by wrongful conduct of the Hospital? 
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2. l\'iust the altemative a\vard for the purported million decrease in the value of 
Center between 2003 and 2011 be reversed because MRIA failed to prove what if any portion of 
that alleged loss of ,'alue was caused by wrongful conduct of the Hospital, and because MRIA 
previously abandoned that claim and failed to disclose it until trial? 
3. Must the altemati,'e award of $21 million for disgorgement of profits based on the 
alleged usu111ation ofl\'IRIA's opportunity to partner with GSR in 1999 be reversed because it 
,vas time barred, because it was waived by MRIA's failure to assert it at the first trial or disclose 
it until after the May 2,2011 expert disclosure deadline, because it is unsupported by the 
evidence, and because it ignores the costs incurred by Saint Alphonsus in purchasing the 
opportunity? 
4. Should this Court foreclose entry of any altemative judgment disgorging profits 
based on alleged usurpation of the Meridian opportunity, as may be urged depending on the 
resolution of other appeal issues, because that claim is not supported by the evidence? 
5. Is the Hospital entitled to a new trial because: 
a. notwithstanding that Saint Alphonsus's 2004 dissociation had been held to 
be "rightful" under Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b), the trial court gave a jury instruction and admitted 
improper evidence that invited the jury to find that Saint Alphonsus's dissociation was a breach 
of fiducial), duty if done \vith an "improper motivation"? 
b. the trial court refused to direct a verdict foreclosing MRIA's claim that the 
Hospital breached its fiducim), duties by failing to enforce a provision in its radiology services 
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that required GSR to proyide 24/7 coverage for Center's outpatients, when 
the agreement unambiguously and as a matter of law did not extend to Center's outpatients? 
c. the trial court made a number of erroneous and prejudicial evidentimy 
mlings that aided Iv1RIA's attack on the Hospital as profit-obsessed, secretive, and intimidating 
to partners, while preventing Saint Alphonsus from oftering proper responses to those allegations? 
6. Must the judgment in fayor of Center and Mobile be reversed because those 
entities were improperly joined as parties on remand despite all their claims being time barred? 
7. Where all damages at issue supposedly resulted ft-om competitive losses to IMI 
caused by joint conspiratorial efforts of the Hospital and settling defendants including GSR and 
IMI, in violation of various tort and contract duties owed by the Hospital, did the trial court err in 
apportioning damages only as to the tort claims and thus in eflective1y foreclosing any practical 
chance to apportion damages between the Hospital and the settling co-defendants, and should the 
trial court have apportioned damages on a pro rata, or "equal shares," basis rather than 
submitting the question of relative fimlt to the jury? 
8. Is Saint Alphonsus entitled to interest on its award of its depaliing partner share at 
the statutory rate of 12% running ii"om the date of dissociation? 
9. Is Saint Alphonsus entitled to an award of attomey tees both on appeal and at trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE MRIA FAILED TO PROVE ANY DAMAGES OR RIGHT TO 
DISGORGEl\IENT, SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT, OR IN 
THE ALTERNATIVE, TO AN A\VARD OF ZERO DAMAGES 
All of th¢ alkrnative a\vards of "lost profit" and yalu¢" damag¢s must be vacated 
because they cont1ict \v1th this C ourf s decision rejecting MRlA ' s claim for wrongflll 
dissociation and ruling that th¢ concerns expressed in Pope v. In term Olfll fain Gas must be 
considered at the retriaL The disgorgement award should be vacated as well, as it is based on a 
time-barred claim and is contrary to the evidence. Because MRlA thus failed to prove that any 
damages were caused by the Hospital's misconduct, or that MRIA is entitled to disgorgement, 
this Court should enter judgment for the Hospital on all claims, or in the alternative, enter a 
judgment awarding MRIA zero damages. See Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Constf'. & Trucking, 
Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 770, 264 P.3d 400,409 (2011): ;.t1cKinley v. Guaranty Nat'! Ins., 144 Idaho 
247,253, 159 P.3d 884,890 (2007); Pope, 103 Idaho at 237,646 P.2d at 1008; cf Trilogy 
Network Sys. v. Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 847, 172 P.3d 1119, 1122 (2007). 
A. MRIA's Proof of Profits Supposedly Lost by Center to IMI Fails Under Pope 
MRlA's theory that Center lost $27,922,388 in profits because IMI took away its 
business, and that Saint Alphonsus' s misconduct caused all of that business migration, fails on 
two counts. MRIA did not even try to prove that Hospital misdeeds caused all or any particular 
portion of the shift in business to IMI. MRIA also failed to offer any non-speculative basis for 
discerning the portion ofIMI's business that vmuld have gone to Center in IMI's absence. 
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1. MRIA To Prove That 'Vrongdoing By Saint Alphonsus Caused 
All or Any Particular Portion of the Supposed Lost Scans To 1\10\,(' To 
11\H 
MRIA failed to prove that Hospital misconduct, as opposed to competition from IMI and 
other f~lctors, caused all or any pat1icular portion of the claimed business migration from Center 
to IM!. 111is f~lilure is particularly remarkable, because this Court put J'vfRIA on notice of the 
need to conform its proof to Pope v.Intermountain Gas. See SADC, 148 Idaho at 498, 224 P.3d 
at 1087. Instead, MRIA choose to proceed at retrial with the exact same defective proof that 
evoked this Court's COlllinent. 
MRIA's lost profit damages theory at both trials was simply to assume that Hospital 
misconduct was to blame for every scan that 1MI won from MRI Center. Thus, MRIA's expert 
Bruce Budge estimated the number of scans that 1M! had \von from MRI Center in the 
competitive marketplace from IMI's 1999 opening through 2010, and used that number to 
calculate lv1RI Center's lost profits. A second expert, Charles Wilhoite, used Budge's estimates 
of past losses to project MRI Center's future losses to 2015. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4472, L 11-25, Vol. 
22., p. 4689, L 5 to p. 4690, L. 5, p. 4729, L. 6-9. 
Budge anived at his estimate of scans lost by Center to 1M1 by identifYing the physicians 
w'ho he thought constituted MR1 Center's "traditional rdelTaI base," Tr., VoL 21, p. 4532, L. 20 
to p. 4533, L. 17-generously defined as all doctors who refened even one patient to MR1 
Center before 1M1 opened, as v{ell as those doctors \\'ith admitting privileges at Saint Alphonsus 
but not at dmvntmvn Boise's other major hospital and MRI scan provider, St. Luke's. Tr., Vol. 
21, p. 4527, L 23 to p. 4541, L. 11, p. 4589, L. 6 to p. 4591, L 4; Ex. 5000. Even if this method 
- 20-
had reasonably approximated the number IMI scans that \vmIld have gone to Center if IMI did 
not exist (and it did not, see il1jl'a Part LA.2), it did not begin to address the question of which of 
these migrating scans did so as a result of the particular acts of wrongdoing that MRIA alleged in 
this case, as opposed to other reasons, including (most obviously) l\;H's la\vful entry and 
participation in the marketplace, 
This failure to prove damages causation is precisely the error identified by Pope and 
similar cases. Pope reverscd an antitrust plaintifI's award oflost profit damages calculated by 
including all of the business that the plaintifT lost to the defendant during the period of 
misconduct. 103 Idaho at 222,646 P.2d at 993, This Court held that there was no evidence that 
defendant's legal misconduct caused all ofthat business to go to the defendant, so that plaintiff's 
"method of figuring damages assumes, without any suppOli in the record, that the [defendant's] 
operation would not have \von any pOliion of the ... market absent" that misconduct. Id. at 234, 
646 P.2d at 1005. This ruling echoed this Court's many statements that "both amount and 
causation [of damages] must be proven with reasonable certainty." Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trollt 
Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007); see also Tvvin Falls Fa1711 & City Distrib., 
Inc. 1'. D & B SZlPPZV Co" 96 Idaho 351,360,528 P.2d 1286, 1295 (1974) (damages may not be 
awarded for business losses when "the evidence does not support a finding that all of th[ ose] 
losses ... were the result of the [defendants'] breaches"). 
It was thus necessary for Budge "to separate the damages that resulted from the lawflll 
entry of a powerful competitor [IMI] ... from the damages that resulted from particular forms of 
misconduct allegedly committed" by Saint Alphonsus. Schiller & ScJllnidt, Inc. 1'. Nordisco 
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F.2d 41 415-16 (7th eif. 1992) (Posner, J.); see Synthes Spine Co. v. 
No. 04-CV-4140, 2006 WL 3053317, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Oct 23, 2006) (plaintiff may not assume 
"that 100% of [a company's] business losses" to a competitor are attributable to misconduct 
where the plaintiff "never attempted to isolate the etIect of other causes on the volume of saies," 
including, for example, "the entry of [the competitor] into the competitive marketplace"). But 
MRIA had its experts simply assume, exactly as they did at the first trial, that all of the claimed 
movement of business fi'Om Center to rMI \vas caused by Saint Alphonsus's wrongdoing. Tr., 
Vol. 21, p. 4527, L 23 to p. 4532, L 9, p. 4589, L 6 to p. 4591, L 4, p. 4642, L 5-22, p. 4653, 
L 24 to p. 4654, L 23; Ex. 5000. Indeed, Budge acknowledged repeatedly that he had not "tried 
to disaggregate ... that portion of what [he] hal dJ identified as damages caused by wrongful 
conduct ii'om that portion of any decline in the profitability ofMRIA that was simply attributable 
to competitive circumstances in the marketplace," id. p. 4653, L 24 to p. 4654, L 23, instead 
"assum[ing]" that Hospital misconduct caused all of the migration.3 
The assumption that any improper conduct by Saint Alphonsus caused all ofIMI's 
success in winning business from MRI Center deties conm10n sense. Once Saint Alphonsus's 
dissociation is recognized to have been proper, its remaining alleged misdeeds amount to such 
things as providing technological assistance to IMI and allowing GSR to reduce its hours of 
service at tv1RI Center. MRIA did not attempt to prove that these specific acts (rather than lavdlll 
3 Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4468, L. 22-24 (,,[\vJith respect to ... causation," Budge "receive[d] 
assumptions"); id. p. 4507, L. 15-20 ("my job was to measure \vhat the diversion of scans was"); 
id. p. 4535, L. 4-13 (Budge noting his "assum[ption)" that scan diversion was "cause[d]" by "all 
of these cumulative actions" by Saint Alphonsus); id. p. 4609, L 1-4 (Budge agreeing he is "not 
opining on causation"); id. p. 4628, L. 15-17 (same). 
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competition ±rom IMI) caused any specifIc portion alone all-the claimed business 
migration ±rom Center to 1M!. Indeed, Budge conceded the usual expectation that a new 
competitor \vill take some of the business from those already in the market. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4603, 
L 3-19. This usual expectation \vas accentuated here by the 1MI physicians' excellent 
reputations among referring doctors and by the 1M1 t~lcility' s strategic dO\vntovm location. T r., 
VoL 25, p. 5602, L 20 to p. 5603, L 3, Vol. 26, p. 5776, L 3-14, p. 5799, L 24 to p. 5800, L 17, 
p. 5805, L 11 to p. 5806, L 19. 
No witness offered any support for ascribing Center's competitive losses entirely to the 
Hospital's conduct. Indeed, MRlA offered no evidence that even one physician actually changed 
his referring practices as a result of Saint Alphonsus's actions. At the same time, several 
physicians gave unrebutted testimony that their decisions to send patients to 1M1 were based on 
the identity and reputation of the 1MI radiologists and factors such as patient convenience, rather 
than on anything Saint Alphonsus did. Tr., Vol. 25, p. 5606, L 7 to p. 5610, L 21; VoL 26, p. 
5780, L 19 to p. 5781, L 3, p. 5807, L 3 to p. 5809, L 2. Moreover, as discussed in more detail 
below, the evidence shO\ved that the bulk ofMRlA's business losses resulted from MRlA's own 
decision to fire the GSR radiologists after Saint Alphonsus had rightfhlly dissociated from the 
partnership. See infra Part I.e., at pp. 34-35. 
Accordingly, MRlA failed to pH.we that misconduct by Saint Alphonsus \vas the cause of 
any particular portion of: let alone all of. the scan migration from Center to 1MI, and the award 
oflost profits to MRI Center must be reyersed. 
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2. MRIA To Prove the Quantity of Scan Business That Center 
Lost To 1MI 
Even apart it-om MRIA's complete failure to proye that misconduct by Saint Alphonsus 
was the cause of any loss of business to IMI, MRIA's proof of Center's lost profits ,yas fatally 
deficient for the separate and independent reason that Budge's estimate of the quantity of scans 
lost by Center to 1MI was admittedly nothing more than a rough guess. 
As noted, Budge counted a scan perfonned at IMI's dmvntmvn facility as having been 
\von from MRI Center if it came from a physician who was part of what he defined as MRI 
Center's "traditional referral base." Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4532, L 25 to p. 4533, L 2. That 
"traditional referral base" was primarily composed of physicians who had refen'ed at least one 
patient to MRI Center before 1MI opened in September 1999, Tr., VoL 21, p. 4527, L 23 to p. 
4541, L 11, p. 4589, L 6 to p. 4591, L. 4; Ex. 5000. Budge claimed all referrals by these 
physicians as "lost" scans, even if the same physician had also, during the same period, reten'ed 
patients to facilities other than Center, including the one at Sf. Luke's. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4589, L. 6 
to p. 4595, L 15. Budge thus conceded that where a physician consistently referred 90% ofh1s 
patients to St Luke's and 10% to MRI Center before 1M1 opened in 1999, and thereafter referred 
100% of his patients to 1."\11, Budge would treat all of the physician's post-1999 refenals to 1M1 
as business lost by MR1 Center. Id. p. 4595, L. 9 to p. 4596. L 20. Obviously, there is no reason 
to believe this physician would have sent all his patients to Center-he had never done so before. 
This Haw in Budge's methodology resulted in a gross overstatement ofMRI Center's 
"lost" scans because the yast majority of those scans \vere referred to 1\11 by physicians 
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\vith St. Luke's and Saint Alphonsus, Ex. 987; Tr., Vol. 27, p. 6131, L 24 to p. 
6134, L 7, and, according to Budge's mvn key premise that a physician's hospital affiliations 
\vill significantly impact decisions \vhere to refer patients for MRI scans, these dual-at1iliated 
physicians would have been expected to split their pre-Hv11 referrals between Saint Alphonsus 
and St. Luke's, TI'., Vol. 21, p. 4508, L 9 to p. 4509, L 6; p. 4531, L 18-21. Faced with this 
reality, Budge grudgingly "recognize [ d]" and "admitt[ ed]" on cross-examination that his lost 
profits model "has a risk of overstatement" because it counted as losses to l'v1RI Center an 
indetemlinate number of scans that would have been perfonned by St. Luke's-and not by MRI 
Center-ifIMI had never existed. ld. p. 4595, LIto p. 4601, L 14, p. 4639. L 10-25. But 
Budge made no effort to quantify the overstatement, saying that he had not "known how to 
approach that. I have not tried." Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4639, L 22-25. 
Instead, Budge said that he compensated for this major error by not claiming as lost scans 
those refen'ed to 1MI by physicians who had never referred anyone to MRI Center before IMI 
opened, and who had admitting priyi1eges at both Saint Alphonsus and St. Luke's. Ex. 5000; Tr., 
Vol. 21, p. 4600, L 16 to p. 4601, L 4. Thus, just as some included scans should not ha've been 
counted as lost, other scans not counted as "lost" might possibly have gone to MR1 Center in the 
absence of 1M!. See id. 
Far from showing a sort of rough justice reasonableness of MRIA's estimate of hmv 
many IMI scans were diverted from Center, this substantial over- and under-inclusiveness simply 
shmvs Budge's model to be completely unsound. Budge oifered no analysis suggesting that the 
substantial inaccuracies of the included and excluded categories are at all equal in size or cancel 
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out It is as Budge had counted as "lost" IMI scans referred from 
physicians whose last names started \vith the letters A through M, and defended that 
methodology by asserting that any over-counting \yas onset by not including any scans from 
doctors whose last names began with N through Z. The hyo categories used to define Center's 
"traditional referral base" thus fail to provide any rationale for determining the volume of IMI 
scans that \vould otherwise have gone to Center. Accordingly, even apart from its failure to 
prove causation as required by Pope, MRIA failed to prove the quantity of scan business that 
IMl won from MRI Center, rendering its proof of lost-profits damages improperly speculative. 
B. l\IRIA's Proof of Profits Supposedly Lost By "Mobile To IMPs Meridhm 
Facility Fails Under' Trilogy Network 
The COUlt should also vacate those p01t10ns of the altemative awards attributable to the 
jury's finding of $24, 162, 127 in profits allegedly lost by MRI Mobile to IMI's Meridian facility 
between 2003 and 2015 because, in violation of this Court's holding in Trilogy Netvl'Ork .~vstem v. 
Johnson, 144 Idaho 844, 172 P.3d 1119 (2007), MRIA merely assumed without proof that MRI 
Mobile's scan profits would have been the same as those actually realized by nvn. 
To prove those damages, Budge simply claimed that Mobile was entitled to recover lost 
profits exactly equal to those that IMI made on its Meridian center-he did "not rely on th[ e] 
concept of divelted scans" that he used for MRI Center, Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4545, L. 15-25. Budge 
postulated that Saint Alphonsus "discouraged [Mobile] from pursuing" an opportunity to open a 
facility in Meridian, id. p. 4545, L. 17 to p. 4546, L. 23, and then "assum[ ed]" that, but for that 
action, MRI Mobile would have located an iv1RI facility in Meridian, and that Thl1 \;f;!ould have 
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been "cnwnled out" and "prevented" from opening a competing center. Id. p. 4546, L. 8-20. 
Therefore, Budge further "assum[ ed]," MRI Mobile "would have stepped into IMI's shoes" (td. 
p. 4549, L. 26-27) and its "operations ... \vould have been identical" to IMI's in tenns of "where 
the scans eame from" and "the amounts paid and the costs that it took to generate the revenue." 
!d. p. 4546. L. 12-22. Thus, Budge asselted, MRI Mobile's lost profits were simply equal to 1M1 
Meridian's actual profits. Id.; Ex. 5088. 
This approach is directly foreclosed by this Court's decision in Trilogy ;VetH"ork Systems. 
The Court there reversed an award of lost profits for wrongful competition and the taking of a 
business opportunity beeause it \vas based on a eonelusory assertion that plaintiff's profIts 
"would have been in the vieinity" and "\'ery similar" to the defendant's. The Court held that 
approaeh did not "take the issue of damages out of the realm of speeulation." 144 Idaho at 847, 
172 P.3d at 1122. The Comt further stated that the jury may eonsider profits made by a 
competitor only to "determin[e] the reasonableness of the plaintiffs' proof as to its lost profits, 
but not as a substitute for sueh proof." ld. 
MRIA here presented no evidenee of what MRI Mobile's own scan volumes, margins, 
and profits would have been at a hypothetieal MRI Mobile faeility in Meridian. It also offered 
no evidenee shmving that MRI Mobile's volumes, margins, and profits \vould "eonespond" in 
any \vay with those actually realized by 1M!. ld. at 846, 172 P.3d at 1121. Instead, MRIA just 
asked Budge to "assume" that Mobile \vou1d have had "identieal" volumes, margins, and profits 
as IMI Meridian. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4545, L. 12 to p. 4546, L. 22. And in response, Budge 
"assum[ed] that it would have been the same eenter with a different name on the door," (id. p. 
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L 14-16, p. L 16-11), and "that they [Mobile] \yould haye stepped into IM1's shoes." 
ld. p. 4549, L 14-23. As a result, Budge included in his damages estimate eVely' scan ever 
per/armed by IMI Meridian, \vithout a shred of evidence to support that approach. Indeed, 
Budge compounded this error by also "using 11\,11's margins" (ld. p. 4546, L 20) of 
approximately 60% (Ex. 5087). rather than MRI Mobile's historical margins of less than 30% 
(Tr., Vol. 10, p. 1884, L 9-23), to detennine the profits that would Mobile would ha\'e derived 
from the scan volumes in question. 
Not only are these assumed volumes and profit margins completely unsupported by 
eyidence, they are contradicted by undisputed evidence that was introduced. First, it was 
established at trial that the reputations and relationships of the GSR radiologists \vho owned IMI 
were an important reason why physicians referred patients to 1M!. Tr., Vo1. 25, p. 5601, L 19 to 
p. 5603, L 19; Vol. 26, p. 5776, L 3 to p. 5778, L 8; p. 5799, L 4 to p. 5800, L 17. These GSR 
radiologists had never read scans for MRI Mobile, Tr., Vol. 5, p. 774, L 2 to p. 775, L 4, and 
they certainly were not likely to start once the MRIA-IMI negotiations had irreparably failed in 
late 1999 and relations between the two deteriorated to a state of "war." E.g., Tr., Vol. 6, p. 821, 
L 18 to p. 823, L 14; Ex. 803R; infra n. 12. Thus, Budge admitted that it was wrong to assume 
that the GSR radiologists would have read scans for an MRI Mobile facility in Meridian. Tr., 
Vol. 21, p. 4636, L 16 to p. 4638, L 11. It fo11o\vs that the many physicians who referred their 
patients to 1MI Meridian because of the inyolvement of the GSR radiologists would not have 
sent them to a Meridian facility run by MRI Mobile facility and staffed by different radiologists. 
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See supra p. 23. Hence, as himself conceded, his that Mobile \YQuld 
have stepped into Ir.,lI's shoes "really overstepped." Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4639, L. 7-1 L 
Second, the entire premise of Budge's step-into-the-shoes damages theory-that 
~'ileridian could accommodate only one additionall'vlRI facilit/ so the first mm-er would get all 
the business-is both unsupported and contrary to specific evidence. On the say so of MRIA 
personnel, Budge just assumed "that there would only be room for one additional provider" in 
Meridian, id. p. 4617, L. 6 to p. 4622, L. 19, and no one else offered any market analysis to 
SUppOlt that conclusion. Indeed, that assumption \vas natly contrary to admitted evidence that at 
least three other MRI facilities opened in Meridian subsequent to 1M!. See id.; VoL 27, p. 6159, 
L. 13 to p. 6160, L. 6; p. 6173, L. 24 to p. 6178, L. 25; Ex. 991. And it was also uncontested that 
the GSR radiologists would have gone forward with their plans for an IMI facility in Meridian 
with or without Saint Alphonsus's support. Tr., Vol. 24, p. 5340, L. 6-13. It is thus 
unimaginable that ~'fobile v,'Quld have received all the scans actually handled by ThIn, if Mobile 
had entered the Meridian market in 2002. 
C. The Award of $40 :MilIion in Profits Lost After Dissociation Is Inconsistent 
'Vith This Court's Prior Ruling on 'Vrongful Dissociation 
The "lost profits" awards must also be vacated for the separate reason that they are 
inconsistent with the fact that Saint Alphonsus had a statutory right to dissociate and \vas thus 
free to compete with MRIA starting on Aprill, 2005, when the contractual non-compete 
obligation expired. As the trial court recognized, "Saint Alphonsus had no duty not to compete 
4 St. Luke's had an MRI center in Meridian before IMI Meridian opened. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 
4617, L. 16-23. 
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the expiration noncompetition " R. 1 . see Tr.. 29.p.6582.L 
1-5 (instructing jury that Saint Alphonsus "had the nght to" compete after April], 2005). The 
court thus erred \vhen it allowed MRIA to recoyer more than $40 million that MRIA lost to 
competition from IMI cifter Saint Alphonsus had acknowledQed right to compete.) 
~ '-
The trial court's ruling before the first trial that Saint Alphonsus had \vrongfully 
dissociated from the MRIA partnership both established liability and enabled MRIA to claim lost 
profit damages for scans allegedly lost to L\tfI after dissociation, on the premise that Saint 
Alphonsus had no right to compete \vith MRIA f()f scans following such a \\Tongful dissociation. 
See MRIA's 2007 Trial Br. at 2-3, 8-9 (in augmented clerk's record). This Court's 2009 reyersal 
of the wrongful dissociation ruling. and the resulting determination that Saint Alphonsus 
rightfully dissociated from the MRIA partnership on April 1, 2004, meant the Hospital also could 
properly partner \vith llilI to compete with MRIA when the non-compete obligations expired on 
Aprill,2005. See Idaho Code. § 53-3-603(b); id. official cmt. 2 ("dissociated partner is fi'ee 
immediately to compete"); Ex. 4050 § 9.3.3 (non-compete provision ofMRIA partnership 
agreement). As a result, MRIA could no longer justify damages for profits lost to competition 
from HvII after April L 2005, on the ground, relied upon at the first trial, that such post-
dissociation competition by the Hospital was improper. This explains why, as a practical matter. 
5 MRIA recovered $30.161.291 in prot its lost to IMI's dmvntmvn, on-campus. and 
Meridian facilities for the period April 1. 2005 through 2010. See Ex. 5067-R (summarizing Exs. 
5084,5085,5088). (This number is derived by taking 3/4 of the claimed losses for 2005 for 
downtmvn and Meridian, thus yielding post-4/1/2005 losses to IMI's downtown, on-campus, and 
Meridian facilities of $4,405,422. $10.724,467. and S15,031,402, respectively. ld.) MRIA 
recovered additional future lost prot its ofSlO,OOl,OOO from 2011 to 2015. Ex.5078-R. 
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a party's righdhl tennination an agreement and subsequent expiration of its non-compete 
obligations usually put an end to liability for lost profits under both contract and tOlt principles.6 
In this case, Iv'1RIA could recover for profits lost to 1M1 after April 1, 2005, only by proving that 
physician refelTals to 1M1 after that date somehow resulted from legal wrongs by Saint 
Alphonsus committed before that date. 
The district court recognized this principle \\'hen it obseryed months before trial that it 
was theoretically possible for MR1A to recover damages sut1ered after competition became 
lawful if it could prove the later injuries were "reasonably attributE able] to" Saint Alphonsus's 
"breach of [its] obligation not to compete prior to that date." Hr'g Tr., p. 61, L 2 to p. 62, L 10 
(May 18, 2011). But the district court erred at trial when it denied the Hospital's motion for 
directed verdict as to post-April 1, 2005 lost profits, even though MRLA never even attempted to 
make this essential showing. Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6066, L 12 to p. 6068, L 2; R. 2845-47. 
Specifically, instead of introducing any evidence showing how pre-dissocia lion 
misconduct by Saint Alphonsus caused any post-Aprill, 2005 referrals to 1M1 rather than MRIA 
MRIA told its damages expert, Bruce Budge, to just include in the claimed damages all scans 
referred to IMI after Aprill, 2005, by any of the physicians that Budge placed in MRIA's 
6 See All Line Inc. r. Robar Corp., 919 F.2d 475,480 (7th eir. 1990) ("remedy for a 
breach of a tenninable-at-will contract" like the MRIA partnership agreement "is pre-temunation 
lost profits only"); Porous A1edia Corp. r. "Hid/and Brake, Inc., 220 F.3d 954,961-62 (8th Cir. 
2000); Hite 1'. Biome!, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 10 13, 1025-26 (N.D. Ind. ] 999) (exercise of right to 
terminate a contract or relationship is superseding cause that "cuts otT' post-tennination tort 
damages); Osborn v. Commanche Cattle Indus., Inc., 545 P.2d 827,831 (Okla. Civ. ApI'. 1975); 
Buc1de.v v. Cae, 385 S.W.2d 354, 359 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964); cf SADC, 148 Idaho at 497,224 P.3d 
at 1086 (holding lost-profit damages could not extend past terms of the limited partnerships). 
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"traditional referral . ,'{us the very same approach Budge used at first trial, and 
explicitly rested on the premise "that Saint Alphonsus was 110t going to be able to lmdhlly 
compete" after 2005. Tr., Vol. 11, p. 4567, L. 3-7. But that premise was '\Tong, given this 
Court's decision and the trial court's resulting rulings that both the Hospital's dissociation and its 
post-Aprill, 2005 competition \vith MRIA ,vere legally proper. R. 556-59, 1352. Budge just 
ignored those rulings, and "for purposes of [his] damages cakulation," "did not assume" that 
"Saint Alphonsus was entitled to compete beginning in 2005." Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4581, L. 18 to p. 
4582, L. 1; see also id. at p. 4563, L. 11-17 (Budge making clear that his damage calculation 
"did not" "assume that this dissociation cut otT damages," notwithstanding the "allegation" that 
the Hospital had a right to compete after April 1, 2005). 
Budge also acknowledged that calculating post-2005 hamlS claimed to result from pre-
2005 conduct would require an entirely different analysis than the one he performed. First, at his 
deposition, Budge conceded that if Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated, then the damages 
suffered after April 1, 2005 must be detennined by analyzing "the effects of the wrongful 
behavior ... through the tail period where that wrongful behavior finishes manifesting itself" R. 
2302,2308. Since the Hospital's competition was proper after Aprill, :2005, MRIA had no 
claim for the loss of business that competition caused. Thus, w'hen requested, Budge drew a line 
approximating the "but for" ,vorId assuming rightful dissociation-the volume of scans that 
MRIA would have receiv-ed absent Hospital wrongdoing. That line tails off rapidly and in 2010 
actually cOl1v-erges with the scan volume MRIA actually realized. See R. 2308-09. The 
difference betw'een this hand-drawn line and the gray "but for" line on which Budge's testimony 
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and the jury's verdict were based, is many thousands of scans that Budge admits cannot be 
claimed in light of the Hospital's rightful dissociation. This modified chart was later admitted at 
trial, Ex. 889-R, and is exactly replicated here: 
Cha!'t 2 
Actual and But-for MRIC Scan Volume 
As thus modified by Budge at his deposition, this chart reflects the type of analysis that was 
required ifMRlA wished to prove any damages caused, in the court's words, by "business lost 
even after that date [when Saint Alphonsus could lawfully complete] arising out of the breach of 
[Saint Alphonsus's obligation not to compete] prior to that date." Hr'g Tr., p. 59, L. 2-13 (May 
18, 2011). Yet Budge acknowledged that he performed no such analysis-the modified chart 
was just a spur-of-the-moment approximation and the only damages estimate he provided was 
squarely premised on the Hospital's wrongful dissociation. R.2308. 
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At trial, when this deposition exhibit \vas introduced into evidence, Budge again 
explained that this hand-dra\vn modification, suggesting a proper approach to damages analysis 
if the Hospital's dissociation ,vas rightfhl, ,vas only "an approximate diagram" that "wasn't 
based on actual data [or] numbers." Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4566, L. 7-18. Indeed, Budge said at trial 
that he would draw that approximate diagram some\vhat diflerently nO\v, and specifically 
confinned that he was not otIering any expert opinion on ,vhat the actual damages were, 
assuming the Hospital's rightful dissociation and subsequent lawful competition. "I haven't 
been asked to do it and I haven't done it." ]d., p. 4638, L. 12 to p. 4639, L. 9. Budge did 
concede, howe,'er, that, assuming rightfhl competition after 2005, all damages for IMI on-
campus scans ("$10.7 million"), and all damages for IMI dmvntown scans trom 2006 onward 
("about $4 million") vv'ould have to be excised from his report. Id., p. 4574, L. 10 to p. 4576, L. 
5 (stating that these amounts would not be damages under his analysis if "after 2005 Saint 
Alphonsus could compete lawfully at the magnet on campus"); tel. p. 4581, L. 18-22 to p. 4582, 
L. 1 (a111rming that damage calculations assumed no right to compete In 2005).' 
Notwithstanding this record, the trial court denied the Hospital's directed verdict motion 
on this issue, and also denied Saint Alphonsus' s JNOV motion pertaining to post-2005 damages. 
In doing so, it said that the jury could have found that Saint Alphonsus 's actions before April 1, 
2005, prevented MRIA from viably competing for scans after that date. R. 4689. But that 
7 MRIA's expert concerning future damages, Charles Wilhoite, \V'hose testimony was 
directly dependent upon Budge's testimony as to past damages, also conceded that if competition 
by the Hospital was la\vful after Aprill, 2005, then his fuhlre damages estimate would be 
excessive by the amount ($4.9 million) of "any losses relating to SAlUv1C [IMI on-campus] and 
[IMI] downtown." Tr., Vol. p. 4722, L 4-21; Ex. 5078R 
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asseltion is flatly contradicted by the record eyidence. According to MRIA's own evidence, as 
ret1ected in Exhibit 889-R abO\;e (and In Exhibit 5012, \yhich Exhibit 889-R modified),8 MRI 
Center's scan volume actually experienced a net increase during the period 2000 to 2003 (from 
8,371 to 8,794), when the Hospital was supposedly engaged in flagrant breaches of duty. That 
volume modestly declined during 2004 (to 7,369), the year when the Hospital properly 
dissociated. But even in 2005, the year the Hospital gained the right to engage in full 
competition, Center still handled 5,651 scans, showing that it had hardly by then been rendered 
incapable of viable competition. To the contrary, it was only in the years after the non-compete 
expired on April I, 2005-and also after MRlA had severed its relationship with the respected 
GSR radiologists etTectiYe January 3, 2005, Ex. 4353-that Center's business markedly declined. 
During 2006 alone, that business te1150%, from 5,651 scans to 2,850 scans. 
Nor was any evidence presented that Saint Alphonsus somehO\v made it impossible for 
MRlA to compete for scans, or even to secure business tt'om physicians once they had sent a 
patient to IMI. To the contrary, MRlA's own evidence showed that the physicians whose post-
2005 referrals are counted in Budge's damages methodology patronized both MRIA and IMI 
throughout the period of alleged wrongdoing, and many did not make their first referral to IMI 
until after April 1, 2005. See Ex. 4566. MRIA needed to shmv how these physicians' post-April 
2005 referral decisions were influenced by supposed years-old misconduct rather than by lawful 
competition. But it did not even try to do so. 
8 The actual numbers of scans for each year depicted on these exhibits are taken from the 
reports ofMRIA's expert Bruce Budge. See, e.g., R. 634, 1671,2243. 
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D. The Alternative Award of "Lost Value" Damages Cannot Be Sustained 
All alternative awards based on the jury's finding of $25,420,000 for the purported 
diminished value ofMRJ Center between 2001 and 2011 must also be set aside, both because the 
assertion of this claim after the close of discovery \vas trial by ambush and because no evidence 
suggested that Hospital misconduct caused this purpOlted loss in value. 
Fit:,!, MRIA should not have been allowed to assert this claim for damages because 
MRJA affim1atively waived the theory three times in open court during the fIrst trial. See 2007 
Tr., p. 793, L 11-18 (Hwe never asselted a drop in value between 2001 and 2006 as the measure 
of damages"); id. p. 3372, L. 17-25 ("agree[ing]" that MRIA was not making "a diminution in 
value claim"); id. p. 3374, L. 3-4 ("it's not a diminution in value"). The district COUlt improperly 
allowed MRlA to revive this abandoned claim in the middle of the retrial--on September 27, 
2011 (see R. 2619-20)-after MRIA had failed even to mention it during the supplemental 
damages discovery that the court ordered to be completed two months earlier. See R. 731. As a 
result, Saint Alphonsus was deprived of all opportunity to discover evidence of the "present 
value" ofMRI Center--evidence uniquely in the possession ofMRIA-and thus could neither 
effectively cross-examine MRlA's Dr. Prochaska about his self· serving, undocumented 
testimony (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 431, L. 5 to p. 433, L 8) that MRl Center was essentially worthless in 
2011, nor offer a valuation expert to rebut that testimony. 
Second, repeating the same mistake it made with respect to lost-profit damages, MRlA 
failed to pwve that Center's loss in nIue behveen 2001 and 2011 was caused, in whole or in part. 
by Saint Alphonsus' s alleged misconduct between 1999 and 2005, as distinguished from 
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numerous other factors. Thus, eyen if Dr. Prochaska's unsupported horseback assertion of 
Center's present near worthlessness is taken as giYen, J\1RIA's value in late 2011-seYen and a 
half years after Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation and six and a half years after its non-compete 
obligation expired-has no plausible relationship to damages actually caused by Hospital 
misconduct. Saint Alphonsus had a right to yigorously compete starting April L 2005, and, as 
the trial court itself recognized, Tr., Vol. 25, p. 6365, L. 16 to p. 6368, L. 19, there is no eyidence 
whatsoeyer of \vrongdoing in the six years leading up to the 2011 trial. Further, MRIA offered 
no evidence that things the Hospital did no later than early 2005, rather than a long list of 
obyious contributing factors-such as the state of the economy, lawful post-2005 competition 
from Saint Alphonsus and others, and MRIA's own decision to ±1re the GSR radiologists-
caused MRI Center's loss o1'yalue through September 2011. Obviously damages may not be 
awarded ,vithout any e';idence that detendant caused them, while ignoring numerous "other 
variables" that likely did. TVingv. Hulet, 106 Idaho 912,918,684 P.2d 314, 320 (1984); SADC, 
148 Idaho at 498,224 P.3d at 1087 (quoting Pope, 103 Idaho at 234, 646 P.2d at 1005). 
E. The Alternative Award of Disgorgement of Profits Based on the Alleged 
Usnrpation of MRIA's Opportunity To Partnel' \Vith GSR In 1999 'Vas 
Time Barred And Unsupported By The Evidence 
The alternative disgorgement award 01'521,358,838, based on the claim that the Hospital 
usutped NOOA's opportunity to partner with GSR in ThlI in 1999, must also be vacated. 
L Most obyiously, the claim must be rejected because it ,vas not pled or otherwise 
asselted at the first trial, and was not actually raised at all until 2011. The trial court itself 
recognized that the claim ,vas not adequately disclosed before the May 2,2011 deadline for 
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MRIA's updated expert damages disclosures. See R. 2617-18. This late disclosure \vas highly 
prejudicial, coming as it did after the submission of Saint Alphonsus's O\yn expelt report and too 
late for Saint Alphonsus to properly prepare to defend against it at tria1.9 See, e.g., Cit)' of 
JyfcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 586, 130 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2006); Bramvvell v. S. Rigby Canal 
Co., 136 Idaho 648, 652,39 P.3d 588, 592 (2001). Moreover, since this claim was not part of 
the first trial, the district court abused its discretion in permitting MRIA to assert it given the 
court's ruling that the case \vould be retried "with the errors found by the Supreme Court 
corrected, but otherwise the previous proceedings stand." R. 2081. 
2. More fundamentally, the 1999 usurpation claim is time-barred. That is because 
the usurpation claim, which has a statute oflimitations of four years,lO was premised on MRIA' s 
allegation that, at "the point in time" that IMI was formed "in 1999," Saint Alphonsus "stepped 
in front of their partners at MRIA" in order to scuttle a deal that was being negotiated bet\veen 
MRIA and GSR, Tr., Vol. 29, p. 6638, L. 16 to p. 6641, L. 22 (closing). Thus, MRIA's claim 
based on these supposed actions taken by Saint Alphonsus no later than December 1999, see 
supra pp. 5-6, had to be filed no later than four years after the alleged usurpation occurred, i.e., 
by the end of2003. But this la\vsuit did not begin until October 2004. 2007 R., Vol. I, pp. 55-62. 
9 \Vhile the Court held that MRIA's disgorgement theOlY "vas not properly disclosed, its 
remedy \yas to offer Saint Alphonsus the opportunity to obtain a new expelt report on 
disgorgement and to allow J\1RIA to depose this disgorgement expert. R. 2617-19. This relief 
was obviously neither practical nor fair given the mid-trial timing of the ruling. 
]0 Usurpation or co-opting of a pa1111ership opportunity is a breach of fiduciary duty, see, 
e.g., McCann 1'. ~"'fcCann, 138 Idaho 228, 233, 61 P.3d 585,590 (2002), which has a statute of 
limitations of four years. See Idaho Code § 5-224; Jones 1'. Kootenai CI1(1'. Title Ins. Co., 125 
Idaho 607, 614, 873 P.2d 861,868 (1994). 
- 38-
The Hospital asserted statute oflimitations at the first opportunity, once this new 
claim was advanced. See R. 2328-29. Without even discussing the merits of the issue, the trial 
court focused on \vhether the new argument was foreclosed by the law of the case, since prior to 
the first trial, Judge McLaughlin had rejected a statute of limitations defense relating to di1Jerent 
breach offiduciary duty allegations then in the case. Tr., Vol. 28, p. 6315, L. 4 to p. 6317, L. 14; 
see also, e.g., R. 3326 & n.1. But law of the case only "pre\~ents consideration on a subsequent 
appeal of alleged errors that might hare been, but \vere not, raised in the earlier appeaL" Ta.vlor 
v. }"faife, 146 Idaho 705, 709, 201 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2009) (emphasis added). Because MRIA 
never claimed at the first trial that Saint Alphonsus usurped an 0ppoltunity to partner with GSR 
in 1999, a fact that MRIA concedes, 11 Saint Alphonsus had no opportunity to challenge this 
unadvanced claim as untimely and Judge McLaughlin could not, and did not, address the 
timeliness of any usurpation claim. See 2007 Tr., p. 4196, L. 5-12. 
Thus, on the undisputed record, the 1999 usurpation claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations, and there was no ruling to the contrary at the prior trial.!::: 
11 MRIA alleged a d(fferent theory of usurpation during the first trial-that Saint 
Alphonsus usurped MRIA's opporhmity to build a facility in Meridian (a claim which it again 
advanced on retrial). See R. 2212, 2228, 2272. MRIA acknowledged in a court filing that only 
this theory was asserted during the first trial. R. 2550. But this distinct usurpation claim \vas not 
subject to a statute-of-limitations detense, as it did not accme until 2002, less than four years 
from the filing ofMRIA's counterclaims. 
12 The 1999 usurpation claim is also unsupported by the evidence. It depended on Iv1RIA 
showing that it vvas close to a deal with GSR, and would have closed the deal but for interference 
by the Hospital in late 1999. See R. 2268. But the evidence introduced at trial demonstrated that 
notwithstanding a hearsay statement by GSR negotiator Tim Hall that a deal between GSR and 
MRIA was "yery close to being finalized" in April 1999. Ex. 4079; see also id. p. 252, L. 6 to p. 
255. L. 12, there were still numerous umesolved issues necessary for the deal to occur. See, e.g., 
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3. Aside from these grounds requiring complete of the disgorgement a\yard, 
the district court also miscalculated the amount to be disgorged, namely the profits that Saint 
Alphonsus eamed on its inYestment in 1M!. The district court a\vard of approximately $21.4 
million represents the past and projected income realized by Saint Alphonsus from its investment 
in 1MI, through 2015. But Saint Alphonsus also paid approximately $11.2 million to partner 
with GSR in the MRl side ofIMI's imaging business in 2006, and thus to receh'e this income 
stream. See Tr., Vol. 22, p. 4888, L. 15-19 (Per CFO Ken Fry, the "total Saint Alphonsus paid" 
for its interest in MRl p01iion ofIMI "was roughly 11.2 million"). 
(continued ... ) 
Ex. 415 §§ 1.1,2.2,2.6 (May 1999 draft proposal noting unresolyed "issues"). More 
significantly, the eyidence also showed that after Apri11999, MRlA altered its position with 
regard to seyeral temlS of the deal to the disad'vantage of GSR, including increasing the size of 
the non-compete radius that GSR \vould be required to respect 1iom four miles in April 1999, to 
ten miles in :tvlay 1999, to 100 miles in June 1999. See Ex. 415; Ex. 4085, p. 2; Ex. 418, § 2.2, 
and decreasing the amount of the management fee that GSR would receive, compare Ex. 415 
vl/ith Ex. 4085, p. 2. With respect to these increasing demands by 1vIRIA, Dr. Curran ofMRIA 
said on June 17, 1999, "I don't think the rads [GSR] are going to accept the decisions we made at 
the [MRIA] Board [meeting] re the rad imaging center partnership." Ex. 800. And, just as Dr. 
Curran had anticipated, GSR refused MRlA's offer of partnership in August 1999. Ex. 398 
(radiologists "rejected the proposal that the rad center be owned by" Center); Ex. 4099, Ex. 4104. 
Thus, the documentary evidence unambiguously demonstrates that the parties' 
negotiations fell apart \vhen MRlA changed its offer tt)r the worse and proposed unacceptable 
terms to GSR. as confinned by witness testimony. See Tr., VoL 12, p. 2323, L. 25 to p. 2324. L. 
12 (9/27111 Schamp) ("My view is that through much of '99, as talks progressed, they actually 
got a bit further apart."); id., VoL 16, p. 3323, L. 8-18 (10/4/11 Cliff) ("In late August, the \veek 
before 1MI opened," MRIA and GSR ,vere "getting further and further apart in the negotiations. 
They were coming nowhere near a deal before 1MI opened. "). The hopelessness of any fhrther 
discussions was made unmistakeably clear at the December 16, 1999 meeting, after which all 
agreed no l\;lRIA-GSR deal was possible. See supra pp. 5-6. MRlA thus did not lose that 
opportunity as a result of usurpation by Saint Alphonsus, and MRIA should not be entitled to any 
disgorgement remedy based on this usurpation. 
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Saint Alphonsus demonstrated that the amount it gained as a result of the alleged 
USU11x1tion is the difference bet\\'een the income recerved and the amount paid to receive it-
S21.4 million minus SI 1.2 million, or SlO.2 million. R. 3332-33; Tr., Vol. 22, p. 4888, L. 15-19. 
The district court, however, refused to deduct any part of the purchase price, because Saint 
Alphonsus still O\\7ns half ofIMI's MRI business, and thus a right to receive a share of any 
income after 2015. That business, the court speculated, has additional value-namely its post-
2015 income stream. R.3369. But MRIA did nothing to carry its burden of proving either the 
existence or the value of that hypothetical stream of income, or what if any portion of Saint 
Alphonsus's investment in 2006 was attributable to this hypothetical post-20 15 income stream, 
and the court did not hazard a guess as to what those might be. The disgorgement award must be 
therefore reduced by the entirety of the S 11.2 million expense. 
4. MRIA also is not entitled to an alternative award of disgorgement of Saint 
Alphonsus's Meridian-related profits based on Saint Alphonsus' s alleged usurpation of the 
distinct opportunity to open an MRI facility in Meridian. TIle trial court's judgment does not 
reflect the jury's advisory verdict No. 32 relating to this separate claim, but MRIA might seek to 
have that claim made part of the judgment on remand, depending on the result of this appea1.13 
13 Though the jury's advisory verdict awarded $19 million for Meridian disgorgement, 
MRIA conceded in post-trial briefing that there was no evidence to support this figure, R. 3276-
87, and, indeed, that MRIA did not directly present an appropriate figure in its expert testimony, 
R. 3288 & n.1. MRlA contended, however, that one could "derive[]" from its expert's testimony 
that Saint Alphonsus's Meridian-related income is $7.2 million. Id. Assuming that it is possible 
to reverse engineer this figure f1.-om the numbers that MRlA did present, however, the $7.2 
million in income ",,,ouid still need to be reduced by the cost to Saint Alphonsus of purchasing a 
50% share ofIMI's MRI business, for the reasons explained in the preceding paragraph. As 
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But that claim is not supported substantial eV'idence and is against clear ,,;eight of 
the evidence. Specifically, whether or not Saint Alphonsus violated its contractual and fiduciary 
duty obligations with respect to IMI's Meridian f~lCility, there is no evidence in the record, apali 
from the mere "assumptions" ofMRLA..'s damages expert, that the lvleridian market could not 
support entry by both 1M1 and MRIA. See supra p. 29. To the contrary, MRI Mobile could have 
srill opened a facility in Meridian after 1M1 did, as at least three other entities did after 1MI 
Meridian opened. Id. Thus, the e'vidence is that there was a continuing opportunity to open in 
Meridian, but MRIA chose not to pm-sue it Saint Alphonsus could not have "usm-ped" an 
opportunity that still existed after the alleged usurpation occuned. See, e.g., kid. J1efals, Inc. v. 
Aletzner, 382 A.2d 564, 573 (Md. 1978). And, most certainly, Saint Alphonsus is not liable for 
MRIA's decision not to pm-sue this opportunity after Saint Alphonsus rightfully left the ~1RIA 
partnership. 
II. SAINT ALPHONSUS \VAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL ON \VHETHER IT 
BREACHED FIDUCIARY AND OTHER DUTIES O\VED TO l\lRIA 
The jury's verdicts of liability on all claims must be reversed because they are infected by 
a series of highly prejudicial legal errors. Several of these enors invited a jury verdict of liability 
on the improper ground that Saint AIphonsus's statutorily authorized dissociation breached the 
(continued ... ) 
noted above, that undisputed figure is $11.2 million. T r., Vol. p. 4888, L. 15-19. Because 
the Meridian facility accounts for approximately 28%) of Saint Alphonsus's IMI-related income, 
see Ex. 5082, the amount of Saint Alphonsus's purchase price attributable to Meridian is 28% of 
$11.2 million, or 53.1 minion. Deducting this cost from Saint Alphonsus's alleged Meridian-
related income of 57.2 million yields a net profit figure attributable to Meridian of $4, 1 million, 
Thus, S4.1 million ·would be the most that MRIA could claim as a remedy for the alleged 
Meridian usurpation. 
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Hospital's fiduciary duty due to improper financial motivations. The court's to construe 
straightforward contract language like\vise enabled MRlA to urge the jury to premise liability on 
the Hospital's purported failure to enforce a non-existent contractual duty of its radiologists to 
serve MRI Center's outpatients. More generally, the court not only allO\yed substantial 
prejudicial and inadmissible evidence offered by MRIA to paint the Hospital as profit-obsessed, 
unscrupulous, and secretive, but also f()reclosed relevant responsive evidence, much of which 
had been admitted at the first trial. These errors require a new triaL 14 
A. By An Improper Jury Instruction and Erroneous Admission of Evidence, 
The Trial Court 'Vrongly Invited The Jury to Find That Saint Alphonsus's 
Rightful Dissociation From MRIA \V11S a Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
As a result of this Court's prior decision, the retrial proceeded on the express premise that 
"St. Alphonsus's dissociation, as a matter oflaw, was not wrongful." R. 1234, 1238. 
NOhvithstanding that tact, the trial court, in several respects, improperly invited the jury to find 
that the Hospital's rightful dissociation could give rise to liability. 
Early in the trial, the district court sua sponte brought to the parties' attention the decision 
in Bushi v. Sage Health Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 203 P.3d 694 (2009), highlighting the 
language that termination of a business relationship in compliance with the parties' agreement 
can still breach a fiduciary duty jf"improperly motivated." Tr., VoL 5, p. 587, L. 24 to p. 588, 
L. 14; p. 671, L. 4 to p. 672, L. 20. Thereafter, MRIA seized on Blishi to explain its view that a 
rightful dissociation could still be actionable: 
14 Because MRlA's counterclaims relied upon the same alleged misconduct tor all of its 
cause of action and "MRlA did not materially distinguish between them at trial, the errors 
discussed herein require a new trial on all claims. See R. 105, ,; 62 to R. 111, ,; 98. 
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[W]hat \ve are saying with the Bushi case is that, here, dissociation was a legally 
proper act ... but [if] you do it for an improper purpose, improper motivation, 
you can be held liable for damages. And that's \\'hat they did in this case. 
Tr., Vol. 9, p. 1582, L. 21 to p. 1583, L. 8. That alleged improper motivation, according to 
]'v1RlA \vas "the improper motivation to compete with MRIA." R.2934. 
The trial court itself then drafted an instruction based 011 Bushi, unlike any that either 
party had proposed. That instmction, which ,vas given over the Hospital's repeated objection 
that it would give the jury "a license to view the dissociation as a basis for liability," Tr., Vol. 28, 
p. 6397, L. 21 to p. 6398, L. 25; R. 3118, stated that Saint Alphonsus could 
adhere to the strict legal requirements of ... the MRI partnership agreement, and 
still be held responsible for violating a flduciaty obligation to its partners if the 
action taken was improperly motivated, such as taking advantage of its 
partnership position to obtain financial gain. 
R. 3242 (JUly Inst1'. No. 50); Tr., VoL 29, p. 6593, L. 14-25. In response to Saint Alphonsus's 
objection, the trial court ruled that lVlRIA could not argue that "Saint Alphonsus' act of 
dissociating is, itse(f, a basis for liability," Tr., Vol. 28, p. 6399, L. 9-24 (emphasis added). The 
court, how'ever, let stand the notion that it ,,'ould be proper for the jury to infer that "improper 
motivation" for a lawful act \vas a basis for liability. Id. p. 6400, L. 4 to p. 6401, L. 3. Given the 
court's earlier statement that dissociation would be "improperly motivated" if done to "more 
closely align with the radiology group tor purely monetary gain," Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2890, L. 7 to p. 
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2892, L 10, the court's instruction 'was intended to let the jury find that dissociation plus bad 
motiv-ation could breach fiduciary duties. is 
Allowing the jury to apply Blishi to find Saint Alphonsus' s dissociation actionable \',:as 
enor. Blishi held only that some actions consistent \\"ith conrractual rights could neveliheless, 
because of their motiv-ation, constitute breaches of fiduciary duty. But, as the Hospital 
consistently asserted, e.g., Tr., Vol. 9, p. 1562, L. 2 to p. 1564, L 17; p. 1591, L. 3-20; R. 3118, 
it had a statutory right to dissociate, whether to compete or for some other reason. As the first 
appeal resolved, RUPA renders a "partner's dissociation ... wrongful only if" it breaches an 
express tenn of the partnership agreement, or if it occurs before the end of a definite partnership 
tenn or particular partnership undertaking. Idaho Code § 53-3-602(b)(1 )-(2) (emphasis added). 
Dissociation thus calUlOt be '\vrongful" for other reasons, such as the intent to compete with its 
fonnerpmtners. To the contrary, the statute e:\press~v proVides that the duty "[t]o refbin from 
competing with the partnership" terminates upon dissociation. ld. § 53-3-404(b)(3); § 53-3-
603(b); see also id. oHicial cmt. 2 ("the dissociated partner is tree immediately to engage in a 
competitive business"). The idea that a statutorily rightful dissociation can breach a fiduciary 
duty if done with intent to compete thus tums RUP A on its head. 
The Court compounded dlis instructional error through a series of other incorrect mlings 
that supported the inference of a bad motivation that made Saint Alphonsus's dissociation 
lmproper. First, the court improperly allowed MRIA to call a pathologist, Dr. Steyen Wilson, to 
15 And, as in the first trial, such an en-oueous conclusion that dissociation \vas wrongful 
"could haye affected the jury's determination on MRIA's other causes of action," and thus 
requires retrial of all claims. S:4DC, 148 Idaho at 489,491, 224 P.3d at 1078, 1080. 
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that, in an incident wholly separate t1'om the eyents at issue in this case, Alphonsus 
terminated his contract without explanation. Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2906, L. 15 to p. 2910, L. 8. 
\Vilson's testimony buttressed MRlA's repeated references to the 'Wilson incident16 as proof of 
the Hospital's supposed mistreatment of its business partners, including ~'fRlA. In ruling the 
testimony admissible, the court focused directly on the disputed reason for "the decision to 
dissociate" and, specifically, onl\IRIA's contention that "Saint Alphonsus's major motiYation ... 
[in] cut[ting] MRlA out of the loop [was] ... purely monetary gain." Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2890, L. 8 
to p. 2892, L. 4. The court agreed with l\1RIA that the alleged failure to provide Wilson an 
explanation tor his termination "is relevant" to whether Wilson was fired "tor purely monetary 
gain." Id. And it found Wilson's testimony proper because such a profit-driven "teTInlnat[ion oil 
another doctor or medical group" is a "tact of consequence" bearing on the Hospital's motivation 
in this case, ,vhich the court believed (and instructed) could render an otherwise rightful 
dissociation a breach of fiduciary duty. Id. 
This was doubly erroneous. On the one hand, Dr. \Vilson's testimony violated the core 
prohibition of Rule of Evidence 404(b) against use of evidence of other acts "to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that the person acted in confoTInity therewith:' As the 
Hospital made clear in objecting to the testimony, "[\',;]hat [\Vilson] is here to say, in essence, is: 
'They treated me badly, ... therefore, they must have treated MRIA badly'" Tr., Vol. 15, p. 
16 See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 2, p. 36, L. 21 to p. 40. L. 8 (opening); Vo1. 6, p. 895, L. 19 to p. 898. 
L. 21, p. 925, L. 1 to p. 929, L. 8 (Clif1): Vol. 8, p. 1 175, L. 5-19 (Bruce); Vol. 11, p. 1926, L. 4-
22 (Schamp); Vol. 20, p. 4252, LIto p. 4255, L. 14 (Giles); Vol. 23, p. 5199, L. 9 to p. 5200, L. 
10; Vol. 24, p. 5360, L. 1 to p. 5364, L. 2 (Seabourn). 
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L 13 to p. 2889, L 13. On the other hand, Dr. \Vi1son's testimony should not hm'e been 
admitted in any event since its only conceivable relevance \vas to aid in MRIA's effort to 
prove-in accordance with the court's erroneous Bushj instmction but contrary to RUPA-a 
monetary motivation and thus wrongful dissociation. 
Second. MRIA' s end-run around RUP A's grant of a right to dissociate was further aided 
by the court's erroneous refusal to redact tv,'o exhibits in \vhich a consultant, during 2001, 
cautiously ad,'ised the Hospital that, if it dissociated, "there may be a risk of St. Alphonsus 
breaching its tiduciary responsibilities to the LPs." Ex. 4234R at 8; Ex. 4239R at 11; see also 
Ex. 4234R at 2, Ex. 4239R at 2 (similar). These exhibits, admitted unredacted at the first trial, 
were characterized by MRIA's counsel at that time as among the "most critical documents in the 
case." 2007 Tr., p. 4302, L 19-25 to p. 4304, L 8. But their language expressly suggesting that 
dissociation might breach fiduciary duties became highly misleading and prejudicial following 
this Court's 2009 decision, and the resulting categorical ruling that Hospital's dissociation was 
legally proper under RUPA The trial court plainly erred in admitting it as "potentially relevant 
to MRIA's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing," R. 1351, 2085-86 (denying reconsideration). 
Third, the court also rejected several appropriate effOlis to clarify that the 2004 
dissociation was itse1f\vholly proper under RUPA, and thus could not be a basis for liability. 
Saint Alphonsus' s proposed a jury instmction stating that it "had a legal right to withdraw, or 
'dissociate: from the MRIA partnership \vhen it did so," and that, any breach of fiduciary duty 
must have occurred "before it withdrew £1'0111 the MRIA partnership." Proposed Jury Instruction 
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No.8 (July 15, 2(11) (in Augmented Clerk's Record.) But the court rejected this instruction, 
and instead advised only that "the mere act of dissociation from a partnership is not a violation of 
Idaho Imv," Instruction No.5 (emphasis added) (R. 3194), leaving open the othenvise invited 
inference that the dissociation plus an "improper" financial motive, could give rise to liability. 
The court also ban'ed Saint Alphonsus itself from telling the jury that it had "rightfully" 
or "la'vvfully" dissociated. R. 1350-51,2085 (denying reconsideration). In our adversary system, 
the litigants are expected to advocate their positions zealously, and the Hospital's unexplained 
failure, on order of the court, to assert the rightudness of its dissociation, would, at best, leave 
the jurors with baseless doubts. This ruling was also objectionable as one of a number of 
peculiar departures from the district court's separate ruling that, unless corrected by this COUlt, 
the rulings from the first trial \vould stand.!i 
In sum, notwithstanding this Court's prior decision reversing a mistaken finding of 
wrongful dissociation, and a subsequent categorical holding that Saint Alphonsus had rightuilly 
dissociated, a series of inc OlTect rulings invited the jury to conclude otherwise. TIlese errors 
require a new triaL 
17 During the first trial, Judge McLaughlin allO\ved MRIA to tell the jury that Saint 
Alphonsus's dissociation 'vvas '\vrongful" because that te1111, which is used in the Idaho Reyised 
Unifonn Partnership Act, \\'as "technically and legally accurate," and thus could not be 
"prejudicial or potentially misleading." 2007 R., Vo1. XI, pp. 2122-23. That ruling was not 
oyerturned by this Court during the first appeal, and although the dissociation filling itself has 
changed, the underlying principle has not. 
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B. MRIA 'Vas Improperly Allowed to Argue that Saint Alphonsus Breached 
Duties by Failing to Enforce a Provision in its Contract 'with GSR Allegedly 
Demanding 2417 Coverage for Center's Outpatients, Nohvithstanding that 
the Contract Language, As A Matter of Law, Created No Such Obligation 
On August 7, 2001, GSR informed MRI Center that its radiologists v'>'ould no longer 
monitor Center's non-emergency. outpatient "contrast scans" (which required the presence of a 
radiologist) between 7:00 pm and 7:00 am or on weekends. Ex. 4277.4278. At MRIA's request, 
Saint Alphonsus interceded \"vith GSR seeking a resolution, but the radiologists \vould not back 
down from this decision. Tr., Vol. 20, p. 4316. L. 18 to p. 4320, L. 6. From these facts, MRIA 
crafted an argument for liability that it advanced repeatedly, from opening statement to closing 
argument, and with numerous witnesses in between. 18 Specifically, it argued that the bilateral 
contract between Saint Alphonsus and GSR for radiology services also obligated GSR to provide 
MRI Center with 2417 coverage for Center's outpatients, so that when Saint Alphonsus failed to 
compel GSR to provide 2417 contrast coverage to Center, it breached its fIduciary duty to MRIA 
by giving IMI a competitive advantage. But MRIA's assertion that the radiology services 
agreement behveen the Hospital and GSR required GSR to serve Center's outpatients-on any 
particular terms, or at all--conflicted \vith the unambiguous language of that agreement. The 
court thus should have granted the Hospital's motion for a directed verdict on this issue and 
18 E.g., Tr., Vol. 2, p. 33, L 12 to p. 35. L 10 (opening statement); id. p. 189, L 9 to p. 
194, L. 13: Vol. 3, p. 294, L 8 to p. 295, L 16; Vol. 6, p. 855, L 10 to p. 858, L 21 (Prochaska), 
Vol. 7, p. 1126, L. 8 to p. 1132. L. 2: Vol. 8, p. 1149, L 7 to p. 1181, L. 22; Vol. 10, p. 1611, L 
11 to p. 1612, L. 20 (Bruce): Vol. 11, p. 2033, L. 2 to p. 2039, L. 24 (Schamp); VoL 16, p. 3391, 
L 20 to p. 3396, L. 16 (eliH); Vol. 19, p. 3995, L. 3 to p. 3997, L. 4 (Floyd); Vol. 20, p. 4236, L. 
6 to p. 4242, L. 21 (Giles): p. 4276, L. 5 to p. 4284, L. 12 (Corbett); Vol. 29, p. 6627, L. 5 to p. 
6630, L. 14; p. 6670, L. 20 to p. 6671, L 23; p. 6681, L 21 to p. 6882, L. 8; p. 6810, L. 11 to p. 
6815, L. 4, p. 6835, L 2-14 (closing); R. 85';'; 38,57,62-98. 
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foreclosed MRIA from relying on this argument as a basis fix liability. 
prejudicial reyersible error. 
doing so was highly 
The sen-ices agreement between Saint Alphonsus and GSR pertained unambiguously to 
patients of Saint Alphonsus, and not to non-Hospital outpatients of affiliated proyiders such as 
MRI Center. That was true under both wrsions of the contract introduced at trial, i. e., the 1997 
agreement, Ex. 4033, and the 2001 agreement that was in effect \vhen GSR decided in 2002 to 
reduce its hours. That agreement required the radiologists to "perf0n11 all Radiologic medical 
imaging sen'ices required in the /'vfedical Center," and to ensure that enough radiologists \vould 
be "available in the Departments or on call" for "complete and timely 24-hour per day, 7-day per 
week coverage for all services described in this agreement." Ex. 4229 § 1.3.1, 1.3.2 (emphasis 
added); see Ex. 4033 § 1.1.1, 1.1.2 (1997 Agreement). 
The "Medical Center," whose radiology services needs are the subject of the agreement, 
is expressly detined in Recital A of the agreement as the "Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center" that is "own[ed] and operate[d]" by "Saint AlphonsusLl ... a Section 501(c)(3) non-
profit corporation." Ex. 4229, p. 4, Recital A; see Ex. 4033, p. 1, Recital A. The same recital 
further states that "[tJhe Medical Center is an acute care hospital licensed by the State ofIdaho 
and accredited by the Joint Conunission all Accreditation of Health Care Organizations." 
Celiainly MRI Center does not fall in the core definition of "Medical Center," since it is not 
"own[edJ and operat[ed] by the "§501(c)(3) non-profit corporation," Saint Alphonsus, but 
instead by MRIA, a for-profit limited liability patinership \vhich rented space from the Hospital. 
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Also, the operative 2001 agreel1ient provides that "[ flor pUl})OSeS of this 
Agreement, the iVfedical Center includes the Breast Care Center located at 6200 W. Emerald in 
Boise, Idaho, but does not include any q[filiates or otheni'ise ancillmy operations afSaint 
Alphonslls located on Saint AlphonslIs 's campus or othendse." Ex. 4229, Recital A (emphasis 
added). It is undisputed that MRI Center is an "aftlIiate[ d] or otherwise ancillruy operation[] of 
Saint Alphonsus located on Saint Alphonsus's campus." See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1158, L. 11-15; 
Vol. 12, p. 2389, L. 15 to p. 2390, L. 5. MRI Center is therefore also expressly excluded from 
the coverage of the agreement. 
Finally, were these provisions not clear enough, the operative 2001 agreement's non-
compete clause, which prevented GSR from "provid[ing] radiologic or medical imaging reading 
or interpretation services for free standing diagnostic imaging centers," expressly "exclud[ ed] ... 
MRI Center of Idaho, and MRI Mobile" from its application. lei. § 11.1.1(ii), IfMRI Center 
were part of the "Medical Center," so that GSR was contractually obligated to sen'e its non-
hospital outpatients, this exception tl'om the non-compete agreement to permit GSR to provide 
such services would make no sense. 
In denying Saint Alphonsus's directed verdict motion, the trial court found ambiguity in 
the contract due to the "bare t:1ct that the contract requires the radiologists to provide reads on 
MRI scans ... because the only MRI machine on Saint A1phollsus' campus was the MRI Center 
magnet and because of the testimony as to past practices by witnesses ill the case." Tr., Vol. 27, 
p. 6065, L. 18 to p. 6066, L. 3. But this puzzling explanation ill no \vay justifies refusing to 
enforce the plain telms of the agreement. TIle extraneous facts mentioned by the court are 
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,vholly irrelevant as here, contraet itself is clear. See, e.g., Boise j;Jode, LLC 1'. 
Donahoe Pace & Partner'; Ltd., -- Idaho --, 294 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2013) ("When intel})reting a 
\vritten contract, this Court begins with the language of the contract itself. If a contract's 
language is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be determined from its \vords.") 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Swanson v. Beco COllsfl'. Co., 145 Idaho 59, 63-
64, 175 P.3d 748, 752-53 (2007) ("Only when the language of the contract is ambiguous maya 
court turn to extrinsic e'vidence of the contracting parties' intent."); "tfachado v. Ryan, 153 Idaho 
212,280 P.3d 715, 721 (2012). 
The facts that GSR contracted with Saint Alphonsus to treat the Hospital's patients, and 
that those patients historically received MRI scans at Center, in no \'lay suggests that GSR was 
contractually obligated to treat non-Hospital patients who received MRI scans at Center. Nor is 
such a contractual duty to treat MRIA outpatients indicated by the f~lct that for a period, GSR did 
in fact treat MRIA outpatients. That shows only that the radiologists and MRI Center reached an 
accommodation binding on neither party to provide and receive such sen'ices on an at-will basis. 
MRIA's CEO acknowledged as much, and its understanding of that fact is sho,vn by its m'ln 
decision in 2005 to terminate GSR's services to its outpatients. Tr., Vol. 19, p. 4043, L. 4-8 
(MRIA CEO Jack Floyd testifYing that GSR "had no contract with MRI Center that required [it] 
to read scans for MRIA Center outpatients"); Ex. 4353. 
Accordingly, by allm'ling MRIA to repeatedly assert a non-existent legal right and duty 
of Saint Alphonsus to compel GSR to serve MRIA outpatients, the trial court allowed the jury to 
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liability on something the had no control over. :tvlRIA's -"v<.~ru,," '-'H.,a .. ·'" on this 
blatant falsehood, see supra n. 18, makes clear that a ney\, trial is required. 
C. Saint Alphonsus was \Vrongly Constrained in Defending MRIA's Claims 
that it W}lS Profit-Obsessed, Dishonest, and Intimidating to Partners 
As discussed in the preceding sections, the trial court allowed substantial inadmissible 
evidence and improper argument in support ofMRIA's claims. See Part ILA. B. 19 In 
aggra,,'ation of these errors, the district court also repeatedly stymied the Hospital's efforts to 
rebut MRIA's inaccurate allegations. MRIA repeatedly advanced the theme that, far from being 
concerned \1,.'ith patient care, Saint Alphonsus was in fact obsessed with profits, and conducted 
itselfunscmpulously in pursuit of that goal, dealing with competitors and business partners alike 
19 lvIRIA was also improperly allO\ved, under the artifice of "rebuttal" testimony, to 
repeatedly reference an excluded hearsay statement suggesting that Saint Alphonsus had a 
strategy to delay, as MRIA lost value, in order to reduce the ultimate cost of acquiring it. A brief 
note made by lv1RIA's Dr. Giles, Exh. 4154, allegedly memorialized Jeff Cliff s statement (to 
Giles) that Saint Alphonsus COO Cindy Schamp had said (to Clift) that the "[c]heapest thing to 
me to do is nothing," meaning that by waiting as lv1RI Center lost value, Saint Alphonsus could 
reduce any price it would pay to purchase it The trial court properly excluded this document as 
hearsay. R. 2082. But when Mr. ClifT did not recall when asked if he had made this statement, 
Tr., Vol. 15, p. 2916, L. 17-22, lv1RIA was allowed oyer objection to otler Giles's testimony 
including the excluded statement by Schamp, to impeach Cliff by proving that "Mr. Cliff 
attributed [the statement] to her in his conversation," but not as proof that Ms. Schamp made the 
statement. Tr., Vol. 21, p. 4405, L. 6 to p. 4418, L. 23. 
The remarkable effect of this mling was to allow a primary disputant on the side of 
MRIA, Dr. Giles, to present to the jUly a prejudicial statement supposedly made by the 
Hospital's COO, \vhich he never heard her say, and which the person with \vhom she did speak, 
JeffClift~ did not remember. Such hearsay is excludable because it is unreliable, and Giles's 
self·interest does not enhance its trustworthiness. Notwithstanding the limiting instruction, the 
resulting prejudice far outweighed any probative value to impeach ClifT's lack of memory. 
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by intimidation and creation of a "culture of fear," and concealing its improper conduct.::;o Saint 
A1phonsus was denied the right to defend against these allegations by rulings that were each 
demonstrably elToneous under the Rules ofEyidence. A number of them were further 
objectionable in light of the trial court's ruling that the "previous proceeding [should] stand," 
thus ostensibly binding the parties to "the previous decisions 1n this case not ren:rsed by the 
appellate court." R. 2081. N otv\,'ithstanding that ruling, in a number of instances, the trial court 
barred Saint Alphonsus, at retrial, from otTering proper evidence and argument that had been 
received at the first proceeding. 
Fil:<;t, and contrary to MRIA's oft-repeated allegation that the Hospital kept secret its 
negotiations with GSR regarding IMI/:1 fonner Saint A1phonsus COO Cindy Schamp \vas 
prepared to testifY, as she had at the first trial, about her regular conversations with MRIA CEO 
Roger Curran discussing those negotiations. See .. e.g., 2007 Tr., p. 2271, L. 19-25, p. 2299, L. 8-
21, p. 2302, L. 12-21, p. 2331, L 9-16, p. 2237, L 4 to p. 2238, L. 5, p. 2342, L. 20-23, p. 3419, 
L II to p. 3427, L 25. The fact that these conversations OCCUlTed was of great relevance, but on 
MRIA's motion, the trial court excluded this testimony as inadmissible hearsay. Tr., Vol. 1 L p. 
:::0 See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 2, p. 22, L. 2-8, p. 38, L 20 to p. 41, L 9, p. 56, L 5 to p. 63, L. 13, 
p. 73, L 4 to p. 87, L 18; Vo1. 3, p. 267, L 5 to p. 289, L. 15, p. 339, L. 1-16, p. 390, L. 7 to p. 
402, L. 2; Vol. 6, p. 895, L 19 to p. 898, L 21, p. 925, L I to p. 929, L 8, p. 1016, L. 4 to p. 
1020, L. 6; Vol. 8, p. 1174, L 3 to p. 1177, L 9, p. 1189, L. 4 to p. 1191, L 12; Vol. 9, p. 1471, 
L. 7 to p. 1474, L. 13; Vol. II, p. 2073, L 4 to p. 2075, L. 23; Vol. 15, p. 2885, L. 25 to p. 2886, 
L. 9; Vol. 15, p. 2916, L 8 to p. 2917, L. 14, p. 2979, L. 12-20; Vol. 20, p. 4252, L. 6-24; VoL 
24, p. 5364, L. 3-18. p. 5371, L. 5-14; Vol. 29, p. 6636, L. 8 to p. 6637, L. 24, p. 6647, L. 8 to p. 
6657, L. 8. 
21 See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 2. p. 22, L. 2-8, p. 59, L. 5-17, p. 72, L. 15 to p. 73, L. 13, p. 76, L. 
10-21; VoL 3, p. 339, L. 12-16; Vol. 9, p. 1471, L. 5 to p. 1474, L. 13; Vo1. 29, p. 6623, L. 1-10. 
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1907, 7 to p. 1912, L. 20. It did so, even though a ,yitness' s in-court, live testimony about her 
o\vn prior statements, admitted to show that the statements were made, is not hearsay. See, e.g., 
Idaho R. Evict 801(c); State 1'. Smith, 916 P.2d 773, 777 (Mont. 1996) (prior statements by 
witness 110t hearsay under Rule 801(c) when witness himself "testit1ies] at trial" about them).22 
Indeed, the court itself recognized erronvhen it lUled on Saint Alphonsus' s motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but excused the error as harmless because Ms. Schamp 
was able to mention the conversations, even as she ,vas prevented from testifYing was about their 
content. R. 4697-98. But given MRIA's repeated insistence that Saint Alphonsus kept its 
involvement \vith IMI secret, specific testimony about these conversations-i.e., what Ms. 
Schamp said and what Dr. Curran thus knew-would have been highly probative in refhting 
MRIA's contention. The error was far from hamlless. 
Second, Ms. Schamp was also precluded from testifying, as she had previously, about a 
1999 incident at the Arid Club in Boise \vhere MRIA' s Dr. Giles asked Ms. Schamp to spy on 
Saint Alphonsus CEO Sandra BlUce and provide MRIA with information about Saint 
Alphonsus's business. 2007 Tr., p. 3409, L. 17 to p. 3416, L. 16. This evidence of Giles's 
scurrilous behavior at an early stage of the disputed events was directly relevant to the central 
issue of \vho was to blame for breaking up the "big happy f:'l1l1ily" of MRIA and preventing a 
mutually beneficial agreement from being reached betw'een all parties. But the Court excluded it 
as more prejudicial than probative, Tr., VoL 12, p. 2272, L. 23 to p. 2283, L. 7. even though 
22 Accord United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580,587 (2d Cir. 1999): United States v. 
Acker, 52 F.3d 509,518 (4th Cir. 1995); AlYvell 1'. State, 667 S.E.2d 442,445 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2008); State 1', Alarecek, 568 S.E.2d 237,252 (N.C. Ct App. 2(02). 
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McLaughlin had allmy..:d the evidence. 2007 Tr., p. 3411, L 3-24. It should have been 
admitted, both because it was plainly probative and admissible, and because admission was 
required under the court's announced "law of the case" ruling. 
Third, also at odds with the mlings at the prior trial, Saint Alphonsus was not only barred 
from stating that it had rightfully dissociated, see supra p. 48, but also from mentioning its status 
as a non-profit organization. That description \vas used \\'ithout controversy, by ~IA itself~ at 
the first trial. E.g., 2007 Tr., p. 932, L. 6-11, p. 4080, L 20-24. This elTor \vas particularly 
prejudicial in light ofJ'vfRIA's attack on Saint Alphonsus's alleged profit motive and greed. 
Fourth, Saint Alphonsus was prevented from effectively cross-examining ~IA's lead 
partner and opening witness Dr. Prochaska, who expressly asserted that Saint Alphonsus kept its 
involvement with IMI a secret that \vas not revealed until litigation began in 2007. Tr., Vol. III, 
p. 348, LIto p. 349, L 24. During cross-examination, Saint Alphonsus moved to admit Exhibit 
782, a 2001 Idaho Business Review article reporting comments by IMI's Dr. Seaboume about 
the Saint Alphonsus-IMI partnership to show that news of the partnership was aChlally reported 
in the local media. Tr., Vol. 6, p. 803, L 16 to p. 806, L. 17. The court excluded this exhibit 
from use to impeach Dr. Prochaska's assertion of secrecy, id. at p. 812, L 4 to p. 813, L 5, even 
though the article \vas self-authenticating under Idaho Rule 902(6), and was admissible for the 
non-hearsay purpose of shm\'ing that the partnership \vas in fact publicly disclosed. See Idaho 
Trial Handbook § 21.1 (2005). It \vas also highly rele\'allt to rebut Dr. Prochaska's bald 
assertion to the contrary at the very outset of the trial, and the prejudice that resulted from 
excluding it at that time, when no other evidence was available to make the same point, cannot 
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be overstated. Presentation at that time "vould ha,.-e severely undermined Prochaska' s credibility, 
and thus the jury's willingness to accept the elaborate tale that he told of the Hospital's misdeeds. 
The fact that MRIA waived its objection to the document seven weeks later, Tr., Vol. 24, p. 5337, 
L. 8-14, did not dissipate the taint of the court's obvious error, since by then the jury's 
perceptions of the parties ,vere well set. 
Fifth, the Court excluded all e,-idence of the fact that MRIA's longtime lawyer. Carl 
Harder, "vas in fact also the lawyer for GSR in its negotiations with Saint Alphonsus leading to 
the 2001 non-MRIA partnership-the velY negotiations that Prochaska and MRIA said was kept 
secret from them. See, e.g., R. 2142-56, R. 2188-91. The fact that Saint Alphonsus conducted 
these supposedly secret negotiations with MRIA's own attomey acting as counsel for GSR ,vas 
highly relevant to rebut the contention that Saint Alphonsus and GSR secretly plotted to injure 
MRIA. That great relevance plainly outweighed MRIA's make-weight claims that the evidence 
would have been unduly prejudiciaL23 
The trial court excluded all evidence ofMr. Harder's participation in the Saint 
Alphonsus-GSR negotiations, reasoning that since Mr. Harder had died prior to triat he could 
not be subject to examination on the issue. Hr'g Tr., p. 56, L. 12-25 (Sept. 2, 201l). But a 
number of proferred business records, including Harder's own legal bills, R. 2142-56; Exs. 830-
850, showed his representation of GSR in its negotiations with the Hospital conceming the IMI 
23 1\1RIA contended that Saint Alphonsus was implying that 1\1r. Harder violated ethical 
duties by telling MRIA about what took part in the GSR-Saint Alphonsus negotiations. Hr'g Tr., 
p. 44, L. 17 to p. 47, L. 20 (Sept. 2, 20 II). That is not so. It is also beside the point, which is 
that anyone actually plotting to hide something from a partner would not let it be known to that 
parmer's laHyer. 
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partnership, and \'vere admissible regardless of his availability. See Idaho R. Evid. 803; accord, 
e.g.,ln re J1elanie T, 352 S.W.3d 687,699 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) ("case records" of 
investigator "who died prior to trial" are admissible if subject to the business records exception). 
The Court's blanket prohibition of all such evidence was clear legal error and, given MRIA's 
case strategy, highly prejudiciaL 
III. SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIl\IS OF 
CENTER AND MOBILE BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD NOT 
HAVE PERMITTED THEIR JOINDER AND THEIR CLAIMS ARE TIME 
BARRED 
In the first appeal, this Court held that the trial court had en-ed in allow'ing MRIA to 
asselt claims and recover damages "on behalf of' MRI Center and MRI Mobile '\vithout making 
them parties to this lawsuit." 148 Idaho at 495,497,224 P.3d at 1084, 1086. The trial court's 
decision on remand to pennit joinder of Center and !'v10bile as co-claimants, nearly six years after 
Saint Alphonsus rightfully dissociated from MRIA \vas elToneous for hvo reasons. 
First, Center and Mobile's claims \vere time ban-ed. The events giving rise to their 
claims began in the late 1990's and culminated in Saint A1phonsus's dissociation from the MRIA 
partnership effective April!, 2004. See R. 85"63-64,67,78-79,83,89-90,95-96,99. While 
MRlA filed its counterclaim on May 20, 2005, and amended counterclaims thereafter, for its 
own tactical reasons it chose not to include Center and Mobile as parties, even though the 
claimed losses of business by the limited partnerships were always the primary damages sought 
in the case. Moreover, only when this Court mled categorically that damages could not be 
recovered for injuries to non-patties, as the Hospital had argued prior to the first trial, did MRlA 
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move to join the limited partnerships in its Third Amended Counterclaim filed March 22,2010. 
Since the statutes oflimitation on the tort and contract claims at issue are tour and five years, see 
Idaho Code §§ 5-216 & 5-224; Jones, 125 Idaho at 614, 873 P.2d at 868, those statutes had 
expired long before the claims ofthe new parties were filed. 
The district court nevertheless penllitted Center and Mobile to assert their claims, holding 
that the claims "relate back" to MRIA's earlier pleadings under IRCP Rules 15(c) and 17(a). R. 
570-79. But Rule 17(a) permits relation back "only" where there was an "inadvertent," 
"understandable" "factual mistake" as to the identity of the proper party, because the 
identification of that proper party was "difficult." Tingley r. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86,92,867 
P.2d 960,966 (1994). Even then the rule only "affords a reasonable amount of time to conect" 
the en:or. ld. at 965,867 P.2d at 91. 
MRIA cannot satisfy this standard. As with the plaintitI in Ting1e.v, who was denied 
relation back, MRIA's decision to bring claims "on behalf of tytRI Center and MRI Mobile 
without making them parties to this lawsuit," SADe, 148 Idaho at 495,224 P.3d at 1084, was not 
an "inadvertent" "honest mistake" resulting from reasonable factual confusion about who should 
be named. Instead, it was a tactical choice, explainable by the distinct litigations advantages 
afforded by pursuing claims belonging to Center and Mobile without actually joining them as 
parties.24 Moreover, \vhereas Tingley found a delay of one year in joining the correct party to be 
:4 The advantages to MRIA of being the sole party, yet able to assert claims on behalf of 
Center and Mobile, included (i) finessing the problem of the statute oflimitations that would be 
squarely presented if the limited partnerships \vere added as parties in 2006, after the statute on 
many of their claims had run, (ii) enabling Iv1RIA to control 100% of any recovery; (iii) shielding 
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"unreasonable," MRIA \yaited more than three years from January 4,2007, \vhen Saint 
Alphonsus objected and pointed out its elTOr. See Exhibit to 2007 R. #57, p. 4. Accordingly, 
MRIA should be required to live \Y1th the consequence of this Court's holding that MRIA's 
choice was legally improper, including not being allowed a do-over by joining Center and 
Mobile as pal1ies long after the applicable statutes of limitations have expired. 
Second, the trial court's decision to permit the joinder of Center and Mobile under the 
circumstances of this case should be reversed even if the claims were not time barred. The trial 
court on remand announced a general approach under which the case would be "retried before a 
new jury with the errors found by the Supreme Court corrected, but otherwise the previous 
proceedings stand." R. 2081. It applied this rule to hold the parties to stipulations and tactical 
decisions made at the first triaL R. 2081-82. To allow new parties to be added, while :li-eezing 
the tactical choices made at the prior trial in most other respects, is both puzzling and prejudicial. 
Indeed, perhaps the only explanation for it is the trial court's articulated misimpression that "the 
joinder ofMRI Center and MRI Mobile was dictated by the decision of the Idaho Supreme 
Court." R.4694. In fact, all this Comi had held was that MRIA could not recover on behalf of 
those entities. SA-DC, 148 Idaho at 497,224 P.3d at 1086. Accordingly, it was error to a11mv 
Center and Mobile to be added as parties, and all judgments in their favor should be vacated. 
(continued ... ) 
Center and Mobile, y'/hich unlike MRlA had substantial income streams, irom liability for 
substantial attomey's fees and costs should the claims asserted by MRlA on their behalf pl"Q',-e 
unsuccessful: and (iv) simplifying the presentation ofMRIA's case and allowing MRlA to avoid 
the complex but critical distinctions as to the duties owing to and the damages recoverable by 
each of three distinct entities. 
- 60-
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO PRO PERL Y APPORTION FAUL l' 
BETWEEN SAINT ALPHONSUS AND THE SETTLING CO-DEFENDANTS 
Because MRIA alleged that Saint Alphonsus acted in concert with fOlmer third-party 
defendants GSR, IM!, and ICR, R 85 43,47,56-61,98-100, and because MRIA's settlement 
agreement with the third-party defendants pmddes for a "pro rata" reduction in Saint 
Alphonsus's liability, R 1204-07, the district cOUli correctly recognized that the Uniform 
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act (Idaho Code § 6-802 et seq.) entitles Saint Alphonsus to a 
reduction in any damages awarded against it by the "pro rata share" of the settling defendants' 
liability. See Idaho Code §§ 6-803(3),6-805(1) & 6-806; QUick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 783, 
727 P.2d 1187,1211 (1986) ("determination whether a settling party is a joint tortteasor must be 
based on the pleadings"). The court, howe\'er, misapplied the statute in three significant respects. 
Fi;:<;t, the trial cOUli inconectly concluded that the pro rata reduction did not apply to 
MRIA's contract claims. T1'., Vol. 28, p. 6423, L. 1-19. MRIA's claims were premised on the 
allegation that Saint Alphonsus breached its contractual and other duties as part of a conspiracy 
\',lith the third-party defendants, and where a claim is based on a conspiracy to breach a contract, 
that claim "sounds in tort, and not in contract." 15A C'.J.S. Conspiracy § 24 (2002). Thus, a 
"patiy to a contract ... who breaches it on the inducement of another is , , , a joint tortfeasor." 
44B Am. Jur. 2d lntelference § 55 (2007). Further, MRIA alleges a single injury arising from 
the business it allegedly lost to IMI as a result of the supposedly improper concerted acts of Saint 
Alphonsus and the settling defendants. Those claimed acts all violated both fiduciary and other 
tort duties, and good faith, non-compete, and other contractual duties. Saint Alphonsus and the 
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ddendants were thus "joint tortfeasors" for purposes of that injury \yithin the meaning of 
§ 6-803(4). See. e.g., Joe & Dan Int'/ Corp. v. [7.S. Fid. & Glial'. Co., 533 N.E.2d 912,918 (IlL 
App. Ct. 1988) (plaintiff s assertion of contract claim does not remoye parties from Uniform 
Act's cOYerage where underlying joint conduct was tOliious and parties were therefore joint 
tortfeasors). 
Plainly, the statute should haye been applied to, and fault apportioned for, all ofMRIA's 
claims, including its claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing. Othenvise, any appOliionment claim arising out of alleged concerted action will be 
defeated simply because such conduct breached both contractual and tort-based duties. 
Second, the trial court erred in allowing fault to be apportioned separately as to each of 
MRIA's causes of action. Again, NIRIA alleged a single course of misconduct resulting in a 
single set of damages, with each cause of action (contract fiduciary duty, tortious interference, 
etc.) merely proyiding a different legal "hook" for liability based on the same acts of concerted 
wrongdoing. Thus, it \vas legally and factually impossible for Saint Alphonsus to be, as the jury 
found, 100% at fault for the breach of fiduciary duty, 90% at fault for intentional interference, 
and 80%} at fault for conspiraey--especially since the conspiracy count is entirely derivative of 
the substantive counts, see DahlqUist v. Jfattson, 40 Idaho 378,233 P. 883,885-86 (1925).25 
25 The trial court recognized that "the jury's apportionment of fault was logically 
inconsistent," and thus reduced the damages awarded on tortious interference to renect the jury's 
80~'O finding ofliability on conspiracy. R. 4693. The court's rationale for not applying the same 
reduction to the damages awarded for breach offiduciary duty-that the finding of 100% fault 
showed that "the jury rejected the idea" that the Hospital acted in concert ,'lith GSR as to that 
claim--cannot be squared with the fact that, as noted, the e.xact same alleged \vrongdoing \vas 
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the district court incon'ectly submitted the question relative f~m1t to the jury, 
\vhen it should hm:e deten111ned Saint Alphonsus's "pro rata" share as a matter of simple 
arithmetic, Though the tenn "pro rata" in Idaho Code § 6-805(1) is undefined, leading treatises 
agree that "the term 'pro rata' shares has usually been thought to mean equal shares, di\-ided 
according to the number of defendants." Fowler V. Harper et al., James and Grav on 
Torts § 10.2 at 62 n.33 (3d ed. 2007); s'ee also \V. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton 011 the Lm1' 
o.fTorts § 50, at 340 (5th ed. 1984) ("a pro rata share [is] arrived at by dividing the damages by 
the number of tortfeasors"). Thus, "[t]he pro rata rule apportions an equal share of the liability 
to each defendant in a lawsuit. Relative culpability is irrelevant under this approach. When, for 
example, a plaintitT settles w-ith one defendant in a two defendant case, a judgment against the 
non-settling defendant is reduced by one-half, regardless of whether the settling defendant \vas 
primarily or only minimally culpable." In re Alasters Afates & Pilots Pension Plan & IRA.P 
liNg., 957 F.2d 1020,1028 (2d Cir. 1992); accord In reJ(ffj) Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155,160 
n.3 (4th CiL 1991). Indeed, the 1939 Uniform Act from which the Idaho Code "pro rata" 
provisions are derived, see Holve 1'. Draper, 95 Idaho 193,194,505 P.2d 1265,1266 (1973), 
provides that unless state law' contains an "optional subsection" for adjustment according to fault, 
then "[0 ]rdinarily no inquiry is made into the respecti\'e degrees of fault of the tortfeasors as 
(conti.nued ... ) 
the basis for every one ofMRIA's claims for lost profits. Nor, given MRIA's allegations that the 
Hospital and GSR acted in concert to breach the Hospital's fiduciary duties, can the court's 
ruling be squared with this Court's precedent that, for purposes of apportionment, the 
"determination whether a settling party is a joint tortfeasor must be based on the pleadings." 
QUick, III Idaho at 783, 727 P.2d at 1211. 
- 63 -
amongst themselves." 1939 Unifonn Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 2, cmt on subsec. 4, 
in Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Lmys (1939) 
(reproduced in addendum), Idaho had such an optional subsection, but deleted it in 1987, see 
Idaho 1987 Sess. La\ys ch. 278, § 4, thus demonstrating that Idaho now follows the "ordinary 
rule" of apportioning liability among the tortfeasors "in accordance with the number of them 
commonly liable." 1939 Uniform Act § 2 cmt. on subsec. 4. 
V. SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO STATUTORY INTEREST ON ITS 
PARTNERSHIP SHARE RUNNING FROM THE DATE OF DISSOCIATION 
The judgment mvards Saint Alphonsus its departing partner share plus "interest at the 
judgment rate" of 10?/o, mnning from September 21, 2007, the date that Saint Alphonsus 
obtained this judgment at the first trial, "until paid in fulL" R. 5284. This is error: RUPA 
expressly states that a departing partner is entitled to the legal rate of interest "t1'om the date of 
dissociation to the date of payment." Idaho Code § 53-3-701(b) & official cm!. 3: see also id. 
§ 53-3-104(b) (specifying that interest is paid at legal rate); § 28-22-104(1) (providing legal rate 
of 12%). Saint Alphonsus is thus entitled to 12% interest on its departing partner share, t1'om 
April 1, 2004 (the date that Saint Alphonsus dissociated from MRlA) until it is paid. 
VI. SAINT ALPHONSUS IS ENTITLED TO FEES AND COSTS 
The district court awarded attomey fees to MRIA as the prevailing party under Idaho 
Code § 12-120(3) (ciyil action arising out of any commercial transaction). If the Comi lules for 
Saint Alphonsus, then Saint Alphonsus, not MRlA, will be the prevailing party. Consequently, 
the district comt's award of fees and costs for MRIA should be vacated along with MRlA's 
judgment, and the case remanded with instructions that the district court award Saint Alphonsus 
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costs and tees. In addition, the Court should ;:l\vard Saint Alphonsus its attorney tees on 
appeal to be deternlilled in accordance \\'ith Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Saint Alphonsus requests entry of judgment as fo11o\\'s: 
1. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on all claims of the MRIA entities (or, 
alternatively, to an a\vard of zero damages against the Hospital) because the MRIA entities failed 
to adequately prove their damages. In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to have each of 
the various alternative damages awards reduced by the amount of that award attributable to 
losses incurred after April L 2005, 
2. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA's claim for disgorgement of 
profits based on the alleged uSUl1)ation of an opportunity to partner with GSR. In the alternative, 
the amount of the disgorgement award must be reduced by $11.2 million. 
3. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to judgment on MRIA's claim for disgorgement of 
profits based on the alleged misappropriation of an opportunity to open an MRI facility in 
Meridian. 
4. Saint AlphollsUS is entitled to judgment on all the claims of Center and Mobile. 
5. In the alternative, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a new trial on all claims asserted 
by the MRIA entities. 
6. If the Court does not enter judgment for, or an award of zero damages against, the 
Hospital or order a new trial, Saint Alphonsus is entitled to a 50% pro rata reduction in the 
amount of any damages awarded on any claim. 
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7. Saint Alphonsus is entitled to interest on the avYard of its departing partner share 
at the statutory rate of 12% running from April 1, 2004, until it is paid. 
8. Saint Alphonsus further requests that the Court avvard Saint Alphonsus its 
attorney fees on appeal, and also rev-erse the district court's award of costs and fees to MRIA and 
remand for calculation and award of the costs and fees incurred by Saint Alphonsus at trial. 
Dated: April 1, 2013 
Donald B. Ayer 
Christian G. Vergonis 
Thomas J. Davis 
JONES DAY 
51 Louisiana Avenue. N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001-2113 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Jack S. Gjording I 
GJORDING FousEiR, 
J21 North 9th Stt~et, Suite 600 
f Boise, Idaho 83701 
AttorneJ'S for Appellants 
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UNIFORl\1 STATE LAWS 
.\ND 
PROCEEDINGS 
OF 'I'll E 
FORTY-NINTH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 
JULY 3-8 
UNIFOIBl CONTRIB UTION .L\[Q~G TORTFEASORS ACT 
.\:x ;\("'1' (;0::-.'(:1-:11"1"(; C{)~THlllt'no:x .b[oxn TORl'FEA SOHs, Ih:-
LE .\~~; IIF 'l'OllTFEASOHS, PfWCr:nl:llR E :S.IBLlNG R ECO\,ERY OF 
CONTIUBunox, ,l::-.'D MAKING CXIFOIO{ niB LAW WITH HEF-
BRENe R 'l'HI.:RETO. 
lJe it enacted, ,' te. (Use the proper "Ita-cling daus8 fo-I' lhe $tate.) 
SECTION 1. [Joint TOl'tfl!(1s{Jl"s Defined. I 
Z For the purposes of thiA Act the t\' rrn "joint tortfeasors" 
: ~ means two or more pe r~()ll;; jointly 01' severally li,lble in tor t 
for the same injury to pl' r:<on or proprrty , whether or not 
.J judgment has been rI!('{)Vf'l'l'd agaimt all 01' ~ome of them. 
Comment: The phrase "whether or not judgllient haR been recovered:' 
de., is included to indicate that joint and several iudglllf·nt liability is nol 
II necessary prerequisite to the recoH~ry of contribution among tortfeasors. 
Thus if the injured person, P, is hurt by the eoncurrent Ilt'gligence of A 
:lDd B and recovers judgment in a suit only against A, contribution may 
be recovered by A against B in a separate action. This is in accordance 
with the practice in Wisconsin . The common obligation contemplated by 
this Act is the common liability of the tOltfeasors to suffer adverse judgment 
at the instance of the injured person, whether or not the injured per~on 
elects to impose it. 
This Section does not include a definition of "P!'O rata ~hare ," althotlgh 
that phrase appears several times in the Act. Although it might be helpful 
to define this phrase, the draftsmen of the Act feel that in view of the 
difficulty in stating a concise definition and because of its well-established 
meaning in various contexts, the attempt of statutory dd inition would 
prove to be more harmful than otherwise. · 
I SECTION t. fRighl of Contribution .: Accrual; j'm Uaia 
2 Share. 
3 (1) The right of contribution exists among joint tort-
4- feasors. 
J (2) A joint tortfeasol' is not eutitled to a money judgment 
I) for contribution until he has by payment discharged the com-
7 mon lillbility or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. 
N3 
Ii (3) A join t torifellsor who eu ters into a ,,;ettlemellt with 
lJ the injured per;;on is not entitled to recover contribution from 
10 another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person 
11 is not extinguished by the settlement. 
12 [( 4) When there is such a disproportion of fault among 
13 joint tortfea~ors tll; to render inequitable an equal distributioll 
1-1 among them of the common liability by contribution, the rela-
15 tive degrees of fault of the joint tOl'tfell..~ol's :ihall be COIl -
Hi sidered in determining their pro rata "hfl J'es. J 
Comment on Subsection (1): This Subsection creates the right of con-
tribu tion among ioint tortfeasors. It does not, in any way, qualify the 
creation of this right by confining it to joint tortfe(lOOl'il in ~\ny narrower 
~ense than that indicated in Section 1. Nor does it confine contribution to 
merely negligent tortfeasors or to those in any other way imHlvertently 
harming others. It permits contribution among all to rtfea.';ors whom th!' 
injured person could hold liable jointly and severally for the mme damage 
or injury to his person or property, 
Although the draftsmen of the Act feel confident that the BO-l'alled 
"equity rule" should prevail in determining the pro rata shares amongst the 
tortfeasors in contribution proceedings, they have not stated this in the 
Act nor have they attempted to define "pro rata shares" in light of this 
conviction or in terms of the "equity rule." This rule is to the effect that 
the pro rata shares are determined on the basis of the number of tortfeasors 
commonly liable who are available (present in the jurisdiction) :md Bol-
vent (financially responsible). This is in contrast to the old common-law 
rule that the number of persons commonly liable automatically determined 
Lhe pro rala share of each in contribution proceedings. These two rules 
grew up in conll()Clion with contract contribution. The so-called "equity 
rule" now prevails in most jurisdictions, whether or not the issue arises in 
law or equity actiou8. 
To illustrate the equity rule, suppose A, Blind C by their coucurreut 
negligence injure P and suppose P recovers in discharge of his claim S6000 
from A. Normally, A lIIay have recourse against Band C for $2000 ea.ch 
as contribution. But if C is out of the jurisdiction or is financially irrespon-
sible, A may secure $3000 from B and then A and B each mRy secure $1000 
irom C, when, !II! and if they can get it. 
Comment Qn. Subsection. (£): This Subsection merely states the uni-
versally recognized condition required for obtaining It money judgment for 
eontribution. The Act in no way change" t.his requirement for stating a 
"cause of action" for contribution; and the :subsequent Sections permitting 
cross-litigation in the injured person's action, before these conditions exist. 
of some of the issues involved in securing contribution fire in no way in 














































Commtllt on Subsection (3): This Subsectiou iii included to IIwJid what 
might easily prove to be an embarrassment if it were not covered. Nobody 
would deny tha t payment of an injured person's claim by one of the tort-
ieasors, pursuant to a settlement instead of after judgment in a lawsuit, 
should entitie the paying tortreasor to recover contribution to his pay-
ment from other joint tortfeasors. The courts are generally agreed upon 
ihis in those states permitting recoycry of cont·ribution among tortfeasof! 
without the requirement of joint and sen'ral judgment liab ili ty. But sup-
pose the settling tortfeasor has purchased only his own immunity from 
suit, taking a covenant not to sue from the injured person, so that the other 
tortfeasors are still liable to the lni ured person. In such a case t.here is no 
reason to permit contribution since the settling tortfeasor has removed no 
burden common to all or mote than one of the tortfeasors. Presumably. 
under this Section, if a tortfeasor, by a settlement, secures the release of 
one of several tortfeasors other than himself, he may at least request con-
tribution from that tort feasor. 
Comment on Bubsecticyn (4): This Subsection, it will be observed, is 
bracketed to indicate that its adoption is optional. If adopted, it \1fould 
permit apportionment of pro rata shares of liability of the joint tortfeasors 
as among them.selves. I t would not affect their joint and several liability 
toward the inj.ured person. Without this Subsection, the ordinary rule of ap-
portionment of the common liability among the tortfeasors in accordance 
with the number of them commonly liable obtains. Thus, if P is hurt by 
A, Band C, who were concurrently negligent, and he recovers his damaget' 
fl'Om A alone, A may shift one-third of the burden to B and one-third to 
C. Ordinarily no inquiry is made into the respective degrees of fault of the 
tortfeasors as amongst themselves. 
The draftsmen of the Act feel that there is a very strong case to be 
made for apportioning the common liability as among the tortfeasors when 
the evidence clearly indicates that one or more of the tortfeasors was much 
more at fault than one or more of the others. At the same time they wish 
to point out that each tortfeasor is still completely and fully liable toward 
the injured person. Granted, however, that a contribution statute does 
effect some measure of justice in distributing the common burden of lia-
bility equally among the tortfeasors, it is apparent that some measure of 
injustice is done when a tortfeasor whose fault was patently greater than 
another's can nevertheless shift to such other half of the burden imposed 
on him by the injured person. 
The apportionment device is intended to work as follows: If the evi-
dence indicates that there is a disproportion of fault as among the tort-
feasors, the court shall instruct the jury that if it finds the tortfeasors to 
have been negligent, they shall also fix their relative degrees of fault. Thus, 
if the court believes that an apportionment of fault is inappropriate in a 
particular Cl!.Se, none will be made. Naturally, Ii court trying a case with-
out a jury will itself make the apportionment of falllt when appropriate. 
'!+il 
1: lldcr the English tor ~ wutribut.ioll IIct the court alway~ makes the appor-
tionment; but the draftsmen feel that in the United States this bad best 
be left to a jury within the ordinary power oi a court to keep the issue 
of negligence from a jury when the evidenf'e indicates that submission 
thereto would not be warrn nted. 
SECTION 3. [,Judgment Against One Tortfeasor.J 
.2 The recovery of a judgment by the injured person agaill~t 
3 · one joint tortfeasnr does not discharge the other joint tort-
·1 feasors. 
Comment: This Seeliou was iueluded to make universal the cornmon-
law view prevailing in some jurisdictions to t he effect that reeovery by the 
injured person of a judgment against one of two or more joint tortfeasors 
does not automatically discharge the others. Although an automatic dis-
charge would not neces~lH'ily affect the sl!('d tort feasor's claim for contri-
bution against the discharged tUl' tft'a50rs, this Section was thought to be 
necessary out of considerations of c()nsist~ncy, in view of the changes made 
in connection with releases in the following Section. 
1 SECTION 4. [Release: Effect on Injured Person's Claim.] 
2 A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor, 
3 whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other 
4: tortfeasors unless the release eo proYides: but reduces the claim 
5 against the other tortfeasors in the amount of the consideration 
6 paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which 
7 the release provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if 
8 greater than the consideration paid . . 
Comment: This Section is intended to change the eommon-Iaw view 
under which a release given by an injured person to one of two or more 
lortfeasors automatically releases the others. Since this result may be 
avoided anyhow by giving a covenant not to sue instead of a release, it 
was thought wise to obviate what must frequently be considered a techni-
cal pitfall by an injured person who releases one of two or more joint tort-
feaSors for a certain sum, presumably approximately the released person'ij 
share of the damage, intending to pursue his claim against the others. The 
direct bearing which this change has on contribution among tortfeasors, in 
view of such Telea...~ and partial settlements, is apparent. 
The second clause of this Section is included simply to emphasize the fact 
that a release of one tortfeasor will benefit the others by reducing the 
claim again.~t them in the amount of the consideration paid therefor, or 
in the amount or proportion by which the release provides that the total 
claim shall be reduced, whichever is larger. 
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